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In 2011, Amsterdam became a majority minority city. The inhabitants of 
Dutch descent officially became a minority. Only one in three young people 
under the age of fifteen is of native parentage. In short: big cities in the 
Netherlands and in other West-European countries are becoming super-
diverse. So far, however, no intellectual perspective has been formulated  
in response to this development.
Super-diversity offers a new perspective within the integration debate by 
defining the conditions required for a scenario of hope for today’s large 
multi-ethnic cities. We are standing at the crossroads: this international 
comparison shows how a hopeful future is dawning in those cities which 
provide education and employment opportunities for the children of 
immigrants. The successful second generation is taking the lead when it 
comes to emancipation. Highly-educated young people are advocating 
gender equality in their community, as well as the individual’s right to 
decide about their sexuality. 
The super-diversity perspective sheds new light on today’s urban society. 
It is the perspective of a growing group of city dwellers who are decidedly 
intolerant of intolerance and the limitation of personal freedom.  
We are proposing a progressive alternative to the problematic aspects of 
multiculturalism that demanded tolerance for all cultural opinions and 
customs, even those which propagated intolerance towards others.
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“I am worse at what I do best, for this gift I feel blessed” 
(Kurt Cobain, Nirvana)
This book is dedicated to my 91-year-old mother Ans Crul-Bos.  
In her unique, inimitable way she taught me to approach everyone 
without prejudice.
Maurice Crul
Preface
This book was written in the dark days of the Dutch coalition government of Rutte, 
Verhagen and Wilders. It was a time during which one constantly had to explain 
to foreign colleagues what had happened to the Netherlands. We are now in the 
post-Wilders period; not because the Netherlands has changed, but because Wilders 
committed political suicide. No party will risk entering into a coalition with his party 
any time in the near future. Wilders seems to be losing his stranglehold on the inte-
gration debate, and the open wounds that his populist rhetoric inflicted on Dutch 
society are slowly healing. However, no reply has been formulated to challenge his 
vision. The polarisation that Wilders tried to bring about has left us with a strangely 
empty, nauseous feeling. It is time to fill this emptiness with a new vision of integra-
tion. The actor Nasrdin Dchar was one of the first with the courage to publicly break 
away from this path of exclusion when receiving his award for the film Rabat:
“This Golden Calf award stands for dreams. That it is important to dream (…..) 
This calf also stands for overcoming fears, and unfortunately, the Netherlands is 
afraid. We are being injected with fear. A few months ago, I read an article in which 
Minister Verhagen stated that ‘the fear of foreigners’ is all too easy to understand; 
well, Mr Verhagen and Geert Wilders along with you and all your supporters: I am 
a Dutchman, and I am very proud of my Moroccan blood. I am a Muslim, and I’m 
standing here with a frigging Golden Calf award in my hand. This calf stands for love. 
Love and passion. Because without love and passion, this film would never have been 
made.”
This book was also born of passion, but it would not have been possible without 
generous subsidies from the King Baudouin Foundation in Belgium, The Orange 
Foundation in the Netherlands and the Volkswagen Foundation in Germany. Our 
German friends from the vw Foundation had also supported us earlier as major 
sponsors of the ties study, an international study of the second generation in Europe 
which provides the empirical basis for this book. The Expertise Centre for Higher 
Education (echo), whose mission is to promote the participation of students with a 
migrant background in higher education, hosted this project and as sponsor of the 
chair for education and diversity of the main author, Maurice Crul, it has also been 
closely involved with the creation and distribution of this book. 
We are grateful to many people for their altruistic contribution to this project. In 
particular, we would like to thank Miriyam Aouragh, Wim Willems, Mary Tupan-
Wenno, Jan Hoogeveen and Marjon Bolwijn for their illuminating comments and 
suggestions for earlier versions of this book. Thanks to their efforts, this book’s 
message comes across with greater clarity. We would also like to thank Semra Çelebi, 
Serdar Manavoglu and Murat Isik for their moving personal contributions in the 
form of the essays they have written for this book. Super-diversity also includes five 
film portraits by Elsbeth Dijkstra and Frans Lelie. We would like to thank Elsbeth for 
her contribution to this cinematic adventure, as well as the stars of these short film 
portraits – Youness Bourimech, Bilinc Ercan, Muhammet Yilmaz, Miriyam Aouragh 
and Halil Karaaslan – for their enthusiastic cooperation. Finally, we would like to 
thank Annelies Vlasblom for her stunning graphic design work for Super-diversity, 
and Jan Oegema of the vu University Press for his faith in this publication. 
Content
Chapter 1 - A new perspective on integration 11
Tram 51 12
Integration in a city of minorities  14
New York: The second and third generation inherits the city 15
‘Eurabia’ 16
The paradox within the integration debate 18
Thinking outside the box 19
Future scenarios for the large European cities 20
Emancipation follows on from social mobility 23
Chapter 2 - Emancipation of the second generation 27
Hamburg 28
Paris 30
Rotterdam 32
Amsterdam 34
Brussels 36
Chapter 3 - Education as the key to emancipation 38
The fiasco caused by thinking ‘they won’t stay for long’ 38
The balance after fifty years of labour migration 39
Optimists versus pessimists 40
Progress in the second generation is crucial 41
Leaving school early 42
It doesn’t have to be this way! 45
Successful against all expectations 46
Punished for your low-educated parents  49
Snakes and ladders  52
Chapter 4 - Success in the labour market 54
From checkout girl to branch manager! 54
Differences between the countries with regard to positions 
in the labour market 55
Stockholm 58
Amsterdam 58
Berlin 59
Emancipation through the job market  61
Working married women make the difference! 62
Discrimination in the labour market  64
Increasing unemployment  66
Ethnic underclass or modern yuppies  66
Emancipation of the second generation 67
Chapter 5 - Generation MiX 69
Iamsterdam 70
Interethnic friendships  73
The scenario of hope  76
The hinge generation 79
Future scenarios for the cities 82
The majority-minority city as opportunity 82
Four Essays - My Identity 85
Murat Isik 87
Semra Çelebi 95
Serdar Manavoglu 99
Maurice Crul 105
References 109
11
Chapter 1
A new perspective  
on integration
The current debate on integration has reached an impasse. Multiculturalism has 
been discredited as an idea, while at the same time, multi-ethnic cities have become 
a reality everywhere. It is time for what the Dutch sociologist Justus Uitermark 
coined a ‘post-multi-cultural strategy’ (Nicholls and Uitermark 2013). A new vision 
of integration, offering an alternative to the policy of exclusion advocated by the 
right-wing populists and to the tired old demands for migrants and their children to 
assimilate. Our new vision is based on the emancipation of the second generation 
(the children born in Europe to first generation migrants). We will show that socially 
successful young people from this second generation represent the most progressive 
forces within their own communities. It is they who are tackling the themes that have 
brought multiculturalism under attack: gender equality and the right to decide about 
your own sexuality. It is they who are fighting for the rights of girls to continue their 
education, and they are breaking down the obstacles that have prevented women 
from entering the employment market. They demand the freedom to choose their 
life partner and the right to decide about their own sexuality. 
A fundamental element of our argument is that progressive values will be embraced 
as a result of social and economic advances, and not because people are forced to 
assimilate. The power and energy that is emerging as a result of the emancipation 
process which is underway within the second generation is the driving force behind 
what we will call the scenario of empowerment and hope. 
We will argue that in those European countries where the second generation is 
receiving educational opportunities and equal treatment, developments are under-
way that will lead to a powerful and visible emancipation movement among the 
second generation.
The most important question is therefore: where and under what conditions can 
the emancipation of the second generation develop most effectively? Which context 
provides the best environment for this emancipation? However, we must also ask: 
where is the lack of social advance creating division and contributing to a negative 
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scenario? An important conclusion is that policy choices concerning education, the 
labour market and housing can all help to steer towards a positive outcome. 
Tram 51
I was waiting for tram 51 at the stop for the vu (Free University Amsterdam). This 
tram, which travels straight through Amsterdam, represents a microcosm of our 
new metropolitan society. Beside me stood a student wearing a green headscarf and 
a black dress over her jeans, speaking Turkish into her smart phone. Once aboard 
the tram, I could hear two boys behind me, both with short haircuts, speaking in 
a mixture of Moroccan and Dutch. Just across the aisle, an African woman hold-
ing a little boy on her lap was struggling to keep the boisterous youngster in his 
seat. Finally, an older Chinese woman, who had difficulty walking, headed straight 
to the unoccupied seat beside the door. This tram journey through New West, Old 
South and the Nieuwmarkt revealed a different type of urban diversity at each stop. 
At Amstel station, two boys got off the tram, still discussing the business econom-
ics lecture they were about to attend at Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences, 
which is located beside the station. The old Chinese woman got off at Nieuwmarkt 
station, where her grandson was waiting for her on the platform. On arrival at the 
last stop the energetic little boy impatiently dragged his African mother from the 
tram towards Central Station.
According to data released by Amsterdam city council on 1 January 2011, 
 Amsterdam is one of the European cities destined to officially become what is known 
as a majority-minority city, following in the footsteps of world cities such as New 
York, Sao Paolo, Toronto and Sydney. Today, only 49.7% of Amsterdam’s population 
is of native Dutch origin. The other half originates from no fewer than 176 coun-
tries. Partly thanks to a host of films and television series, we see New York as a 
vibrant metropolitan melting pot. Everyone who has actually visited the city has 
been fascinated by the diverse atmospheres in the distinct neighbourhoods which 
together define the city’s cosmopolitan nature. European cities are slowly approach-
ing the same degree of diversity. Their main difference to New York is that in Europe, 
there is a clear, ethnically defined majority group in the large cities. However, they 
have already lost, or are soon about to lose, their numerical majority position. Soon, 
everyone living in a large European city will belong to an ethnic minority group, 
just as they do in New York. The speed at which European cities are changing and 
the immense diversity of nationalities that populate these cities are unique in our 
history. Historians like to remind us that the European cities and regions of the past 
were also extremely heterogeneous. Examples of this include the cities in Germany’s 
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Ruhr region, to which Polish migrants flocked during the First World War and, 
further back in time, Amsterdam, which became home to Huguenots from France 
and Sephardic Jews from Spain (Lucassen 2005). However, never before have so 
many people from so many different parts of the world come to western European 
cities within such a short period. They have arrived in numbers which have, as is the 
case with Amsterdam, turned the old majority groups into a minority in just two 
generations. 
Returning to the view offered by the culturally diverse travellers in the tram, it is 
also clear that the old majority group has not been replaced by a single new majority 
group. Those who are described as ‘allochthones’ in one country, as ‘migrants’ in 
another, and as ethnic minorities in yet another, form an extremely heterogeneous 
group. The cultural and social differences between them are often larger than their 
differences to the old majority group. For example, there is a gigantic difference in 
cultural and religious background between Ghanaian Amsterdammers and Turkish 
Amsterdammers; you only have to visit a religious service of each of these groups to 
realise that it is impossible to regard them as a homogenous group. 
Never before has our urban population been so diverse in terms of culture, ethnic-
ity and religion. When you add the older distinctions of rich and poor or old and 
young to this diversity, you arrive at the image of diversity reflected by the passengers 
of tram 51. The result of this exponential increase in diversity has been described 
by the American anthropologist Steven Vertovec (Vertovec 2007) with the striking 
term ‘super-diversity’. 
Integration in a city of minorities 
Our ways of thinking about who is integrated and who is not will have to be radi-
cally adjusted in the light of the new majority-minority cities. In a society where 
one group forms a clear majority, minorities are expected to adapt to the opinions 
and customs of the dominant group. If there is no longer an ethnic majority group, 
everyone will have to adapt to everyone else. Diversity will become the new norm. 
This will require one of the largest psychological shifts of our time. Some members 
of the old majority group will fiercely resist the loss of their dominant position. For 
others, however, the city’s diversity will hold a powerful appeal.
But how can we imagine the idea that ‘everyone must adapt to everyone else’ in 
concrete terms? Primary school is an environment where this new metropolitan 
reality can already be clearly seen. The present-day primary school population in any 
large western European city cannot be compared to that of thirty or forty years ago. 
Children from the old majority group are already well in the minority at many prima-
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ry schools, particularly those in older inner city neighbourhoods, or, depending on 
the city, in suburbs where affordable housing can be found. Children from all ethnic 
groups who are starting at such a school must integrate into the new diverse ethnic 
reality. The challenge of feeling at home in such a super-diverse schoolroom will be 
equal for all children, irrespective of their ethnic origin. 
Another example from education illustrates the idea of ‘integration for everyone’ 
in more detail. Many higher education students of native parentage move from 
small towns to the cities to study. They live in affordable neighbourhoods, where 
many migrants and their children also live. These students of native Dutch parent-
age, coming as they do from more homogenous small villages and towns, experience 
more integration problems, and logically feel less at home in their new neighbour-
hood than the ‘migrant’ youngsters who have lived there all their lives.
Many students of native parentage also live far away from their familiar network, 
while youngsters of the second generation often have a close and extended network 
of family and friends in their neighbourhood and city. 
The idea of the “established person of native parentage” and “the newcomers of 
migrant parentage” no longer applies in the big cities. In many neighbourhoods, the 
young people of the second generation are more likely to be the ‘born and bred’ 
group than other young city dwellers from the old majority group (Crul et al. 2012). 
Increasingly, these second generation youngsters form the most integrated group in 
the city. They can be found on the street from an early age, and in the process they 
make the neighbourhood and the city their own. From early childhood, the boys play 
football in the squares and the girls, along with older residents, are the neighbour-
hood library’s most dedicated users. At secondary school, they expand their hori-
zons by finding a job in the supermarket or delivering pizzas on their motor scooters. 
As students, they discover night life and the shops in the city centre. In Amsterdam, 
the group that has lived longest in the city already consists of women of Moroccan 
descent. This is an important starting point for a new vision regarding integration. 
New York: The second and third generation inherits the city
The American researchers Phil Kasinitz, John Mollenkopf, Mary Waters and Jennifer 
Holdaway gave their book on the children of migrants (the second and third genera-
tion) in New York an unambiguous title: ‘Inheriting the City’ (Kasinitz et al. 2008). In 
New York, the second generation and their children will form the new majority and 
‘inherit’ the city from the inhabitants who shaped it before them. New Yorkers are 
well accustomed to rapid changes in population groups within their neighbourhoods, 
in the subway travelling to work, and on the work floor. This is characteristic of the 
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city’s dynamic nature and, for New Yorkers, it is a fact of life. Each migrant group 
has bequeathed the city a new cooking smell, a new skin colour and a new identity. 
The migration history of their families is part of every New Yorker’s self-awareness. 
If we look at the history of American cities though, we can see that this does not 
mean that the old majority group (English Protestants) gave up its dominant position 
just like that when the new migrants arrived. For example, at the beginning of the 
last century, the Germans in Philadelphia and the Catholic Irish in Boston were vari-
ously and colourfully depicted as a threat to the English protestant way of life. East 
European Jews were kept out of public positions and denied access to elite univer-
sities such as Harvard or Princeton for many years. Change only took place slowly. 
For a long time, the wasp – White Anglo-Saxon Protestant – was seen as being ‘the 
only real American’. Judaism and Catholicism only became part of the American 
Mainstream after a long struggle (Alba et al. 2012). 
The diversity of a city like New York provides us Europeans with an interesting taste 
of the future. Cities like Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Amsterdam are rapidly develop-
ing in the same direction. With their much more developed welfare states, European 
cities will create their own version of New York. At the same time, European cities 
do not have the same open attitude towards migrants as do American cities. These 
differences may mean that the second generation in European cities has more social 
and economic opportunities, but they also pose specific social and cultural challeng-
es. In many European countries, members of the second and even third generation 
are still referred to as ‘migrants’. It is much more difficult for the second generation 
in the Netherlands to claim Dutch identity than it is for the children of migrants on 
the other side of the Atlantic to feel American. 
‘Eurabia’
This parallel with the history of American cities raises the question of who will inher-
it Europe’s major cities. Right-wing populist politicians in Europe are ever more 
vociferous in their cries that ‘the Muslims’ are going to take over European cities 
and islamise them. Authors holding such views use the term Eurabia to describe 
this dystopia. They see Muslims as a threat to the ‘Judeo-Christian’ tradition, and 
migrants and their children as the vanguard of an exploding ethnic socio-econom-
ic underclass. According to these modern prophets of doom, the cocktail of Islam 
and the formation of an underclass is a ticking time bomb. Their dystopian visions 
alternate between images of unemployed youth descending into crime and reducing 
cities to a state of chaos and the image of young men hulled in djellabas and bran-
dishing the Koran, preaching hate against western society. 
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In the 1980s, labour migrants were the natural allies of the working class as far as 
social democrats and socialists on the left were concerned. They represented the 
modern embodiment of exploitation and oppression. You could say that this roman-
ticising blinded the ‘left’ to who the migrants actually were. To a certain degree, 
this is expressed by Max Frisch’s famous sentence: ‘We asked for hands to do the 
work, but we got people’. The new workers generally came from rural areas, were 
religious, held traditional opinions about gender roles and were, as a rule, proud of 
their origins. These were all values which were being abandoned to an increasing 
degree by social democratic and socialist movements during this period. 
At the same time, the post-war generation of left-wing intellectual writers, 
academics and artists continued to stress the dangers of a belief in the superiority 
of western civilisation, as a result of their determination that fascism should never 
be allowed to rise again. Cultural relativism – the idea that all cultures and religions 
are equal – became the foundation on which multiculturalism was based. Nurturing 
understanding for, or at least requiring a degree of tolerance towards ‘non-western’ 
cultural and religious customs was the rule. This school of thought was increasingly 
put to the test when some people, acting in the name of the same religious or cultur-
al customs, threatened the rights of other minorities (Kurds, Turkish Christians or 
Aleviets), women or homosexuals. In fact, tolerance was asked for intolerance, all 
in the name of multiculturalism. This seriously undermined support for the idea of 
multiculturalism. Writers, politicians and academics (for example, Oriana Fallaci in 
Italy, Alain Finkielkraut in France, Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands and Thelo Sarazin 
in Germany), members of the post-war left-wing intellectual generation, began to 
express their uneasiness about cultural relativism in books and the opinion pages 
of the media. A number of them went a step further by also engaging politically 
with the right with their plea to defend ‘western’ values against conservative religious 
Islam. 
In the meantime, the crisis concerning multiculturalism has prompted the popu-
list right to seamlessly appropriate a number of traditional progressive emancipation 
themes. They have embraced the rights of women and homosexuals as if they had 
never held conservative views on these matters in the first place. This provoked the 
following wry observation from a cynical commentator in Austria: ‘mit dem Islam 
wir jetzt alle Feministen geworden sind!’ Dutch sociologist Halleh Ghorashi calls this 
the culturalisation of the emancipation of migrant women (Ghorashi 2006).
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The paradox within the integration debate
The paradoxical developments described above come together in Europe’s major 
cities. Multiculturalism as an idea is under fire from both left and right, while in the 
meantime, the city as a place consisting only of minorities is already becoming mani-
fest reality. In some cities, this demographic turning point has already been reached, 
and it will happen in other cities within the next five to ten years.
What is the political response to this development? The answer from right-wing 
populists is simple: this must not be allowed to happen. The flow of migration must 
be stopped. The electoral gains of right-wing populist parties in many European 
countries are an expression of support for this position. The solution that the right-
wing populists offer their supporters is, however, a spurious one: even if further 
immigration were halted this instant, the present demographic make-up of the large 
cities will inevitably lead to a majority of minorities. Right-wing populists deny this 
reality. They have no answer to the question of how people from different back-
grounds can live together in this new reality. 
Meanwhile, mainstream politicians advocate ever more vigorously the setting of 
‘national norms and values’ with which ‘newcomers’ must comply. This call to assim-
ilation comes not only from conservative parties, but also increasingly often from 
progressive politicians. They demand the adoption of progressive values such as 
equality between men and women and the separation of church and state. But how 
can the old majority group enforce such assimilation in everyday situations when 
they have lost their numerical dominance? Two thirds of the young inhabitants of 
the large cities already have an immigrant background. Seen from this perspective, 
the increasingly loud clamour from mainstream politicians for assimilation often has 
a hollow and populist ring. These calls do not represent any vision of what integra-
tion means in an increasingly diverse society; instead they look more like a desper-
ate attempt to counter the political rhetoric of right-wing populists. In practice the 
result of these calls to assimilate is that an increasing number of citizens with a 
migrant background feels excluded and unwelcome. These demands are becoming 
ever more far-reaching. Nowadays, it is as if the second and third generation can 
only be considered to be truly integrated if they repudiate their origins and renounce 
Islam. Not surprisingly, this has provoked much anger and resistance among them. 
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Thinking outside the box
Political leaders, policy makers and researchers in different European countries 
generally formulate their approach to integration within their own national concep-
tual framework. Integration practices just a few miles away across the border often 
go unnoticed. This seriously limits thinking about successful integration practices. 
To look beyond the border allows for a remarkably clear view. The Turkish second 
generation is the most suitable group to identify successful practices. With more 
than four million people, Turks are the largest group with a migrant background 
in  western Europe. They are an ideal group for international comparison because 
they have settled in almost all western European countries in significant numbers. 
 Turkish immigrants are spread from Sweden and Norway in northern Europe to 
France in southern Europe and Switzerland and Austria in central Europe.
Originally from small villages in central Anatolia, the shores of the Black Sea and 
the Aegean coast, they were sent by recruitment agencies to the Volvo factories 
in Stockholm, the mines in France and Belgium, the shipyards in Rotterdam and 
 Hamburg and the machine and car factories in Berlin and Amsterdam. 
The children of Turkish migrant workers in Europe were born into broadly compa-
rable situations. The ways in which these different countries shaped their integra-
tion, however, varied significantly. By comparing young people whose parents have 
comparable cultural and geographical backgrounds (migrants from Turkey) with the 
same starting position (all born in Europe to parents with a very low average level of 
education), we could gain valuable insights.
The differences in the results between countries are quite remarkable. In Sweden, 
for example, six times as many of the Turkish second generation go on to higher 
education than in Germany. In both cases they are the children of migrant workers, 
who in some cases even came from the same villages, but in one country they are 
studying to become engineers or accountants, while in the other, their chances of 
entering higher education are practically non-existent. What are these two countries 
doing differently? 
In the following chapter we will show that ways of structuring education and 
organising the transition to the labour market are the real reasons for these differ-
ences. The European countries take very varied approaches which, in practice, lead 
to very varied outcomes. The fact that politicians, policy makers and researchers 
continue to focus solely on their own country blinds us to important success stories 
beyond our national boundaries. An international comparison can make successful 
practices visible. Looking across borders like this gives us practical pointers that we 
can use to develop a new perspective on integration. 
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Future scenarios for the large European cities
In his book ‘The Geo-politics of Emotion’, the French political scientist Dominique 
Moïsi (2009) sketches a number of possible scenarios for the future. We have taken 
two of these scenarios in a slightly adapted form to describe the situations in vari-
ous European cities. Here, we will contrast the scenario of ‘empowerment and hope’ 
against the scenario of ‘fear and humiliation’. In the scenario of ‘fear and humiliation’ 
groups in the city retreat into themselves and society becomes increasingly polarised 
along ethnic dividing lines. Members of the old majority group feel threatened, and 
this is expressed in fear and massive support for right-wing populist parties; at the 
same time, the group of migrant parentage feels excluded and humiliated as second-
class citizens. In contrast to this, the scenario of empowerment and hope shows a 
future in which different ethnic groups are able to break down the divisions between 
them and whereby equality and emancipation are the most important outcomes. 
Which factors lead to a scenario of empowerment and hope and which to a 
scenario of fear and humiliation? The degree to which the second generation attains 
socio-economic and socio-cultural emancipation is crucial. We will show that the 
scenario of empowerment and hope is likely where there are more equal opportu-
nities for migrants and their children. The combination of ambition and motiva-
tion among the children of migrants, and the opportunities they are offered, often 
give rise to spectacular forms of inter-generational upward mobility in the second 
generation. Girls born to illiterate mothers work their way up to become doctors or 
lawyers. The most pronounced form of upward social mobility is from mother to 
daughter. This form of upward mobility is also having the greatest effect. In contrast 
to this, in countries where there are scant opportunities, a large part of the second 
generation adopts a marginal position and a feeling of being misjudged and humili-
ated dominates.
The outcome of the scenario also depends largely on how open a society is. A less 
positive scenario prevails if it is difficult for the upwardly socially mobile second 
generation to identify with society. Humiliating the most successful members of the 
second generation may have extremely negative consequences. Every time they are 
discriminated against when they apply for a job, or refused entrance to a nightclub by 
the bouncers, their resistance and aversion to the society they perceive as excluding 
them increases. 
An important indication of the direction in which a city is developing can be found 
in how the various ethnic groups treat each other and which space they give each 
other. In our study, we found two groups which display a strong expression of the 
scenario of fear and humiliation. One group consists of very religiously conserva-
tive second generation young people who have turned away from society; the other 
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Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:
Statement: It is unnatural for women in leading positions to exercise  
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Highly educated Turkish (69%) and Moroccan (71%) women of the second 
generation from low-educated families in the Netherlands are just as 
likely to demand the right to work as highly educated women of Dutch 
origin from low-educated families (70%). 
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Figure 2
Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:
Statement: Women should not work outside the home if they have small 
children. Percentage answering: disagree or completely disagree
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group – young right-wing populists who do not feel at home in today’s multi-ethnic 
metropolitan reality – is its counterpart in many respects. It is striking how many 
characteristics these groups have in common. Both think that their own culture or 
religion is superior to that of the other and prefer only to mix within their own group. 
The size of the two groups varies from city to city and is an important barometer for 
predicting the future scenario of fear and humiliation.
In contrast to this are groups that represent the scenario of empowerment and 
hope. The most important of these groups consists of young people who identify 
strongly with society as a whole and who have friendships outside their own ethnic 
group. The second generation is taking the lead in this respect. One of our respond-
ents aptly called this second generation of young people the ‘hinge generation’. 
Another smaller but important group is formed by young adults of native parentage 
who have mixed groups of friends. They know these peers through school or work. 
The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2012) states that inter-ethnic 
friendships are crucial to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts and discrimination in a 
society. The dense network of contacts outside one’s own group that is woven by 
inter-ethnic friendships in everyday life at school, work and during free time is 
essential to social cohesion in a city. Thanks to this network, ideas and opinions can 
be exchanged between groups and superficial perceptions that groups often have of 
each other can be replaced by a more nuanced picture. It is the exchange between 
these groups that creates a new, hybrid metropolitan culture.
Emancipation follows on from social mobility
Central to our argument is the group of successful second generation youth. In 
Europe, one in five of them is enrolled in higher education. Despite this, politicians 
and policy makers continue to focus on problem youths, even though it is these 
successful young people who currently hold the key to a scenario of hope and empow-
erment – especially well-educated young women. Highly educated second genera-
tion women are fundamental to both the socio-economic and socio-cultural eman-
cipation of the second generation. Socio-cultural emancipation follows in the wake 
of the socio-economic leap forwards. No matter which part of Europe they grew up 
in, highly educated young people of the second generation are leading the emanci-
pation of the second generation. For example, the vast majority of them rejected the 
statement that women with young children should not work outside the home. They 
did so twice as often as members of the second generation who had attained a low 
level of education. It is not entirely surprising that highly educated women are the 
greatest advocates of the idea that mothers of young children should be able to work. 
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Highly educated Turkish (69%) and Moroccan (71%) women of the second genera-
tion from low-educated families in the Netherlands are just as likely to demand the 
right to work as highly educated women of Dutch origin from low-educated families 
(70%). In the Netherlands, only 9% of highly educated second generation women 
with a partner choose not to work. Only a very small minority takes heed of the fact 
that some husbands, who are often somewhat more conservative, would prefer them 
not to work but instead stay at home to take care of the children. The most common 
Dutch polder compromise in second generation families with young children is that 
the women work three or four days per week, and it is noticeable that some men 
work even more when they have children.
The power and energy that develops within the second generation during this 
process of emancipation is generating a scenario of empowerment and hope. We 
will demonstrate that in the European countries where the second generation has 
been given educational opportunities and equal treatment, a development is set in 
motion that leads to a strong, visible emancipation movement among the second 
generation. Our central argument is that emancipation will not result from pressure 
to assimilate by the majority group, but will be the consequence of social mobility 
within one’s own group. In every country, it is the highly educated young adults of 
the second generation who are propagating the most progressive opinions within 
their own community. This certainly applies to highly educated women, but also to 
highly educated men. For instance, they unanimously support sexual equality in the 
employment market. Whereas low-educated young people of the second generation 
(especially the men) often find it difficult to accept having a woman in charge, this 
attitude is scarcely ever found among highly educated young people of the second 
generation. In cities where emancipation is taking hold, a growing group is becom-
ing intolerant of intolerance. Emancipation is the answer to the problematic side 
of multiculturalism that requires tolerance for all cultural customs, including those 
that are intolerant towards others.
The biggest break that highly educated young people of the second generation are 
making with the traditions within their own community concerns the topic of family 
honour and virginity. Virginity is still the norm for young, low-educated members of 
the Turkish second generation, but highly educated young people are more openly 
demanding the right to make decisions about their own sexuality. A large majority 
of them in every country said they found it acceptable to have sex before marriage, 
either in any circumstances, or subject to certain conditions. In Germany, Sweden 
and Switzerland, approximately half of them said that it is acceptable under any 
circumstances. These are all young people who grew up in low-educated labour 
migrant families. With this statement, they are strongly distancing themselves from 
the predominant traditional opinions about sexuality within their communities. 
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Figure 3
Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:
Sex before marriage is acceptable
In Sweden there are very few low-educated second generation Turks. 
Some did not answer the question; therefore the numbers are too low for analyses. 
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 In countries where the second generation is low educated, the husband is often 
the only breadwinner in the family. It is very difficult for families with just one 
income to make ends meet. Highly educated women are entering the job market in 
great numbers and by doing so they are making it possible for their families to gain 
access to the middle class. The socio-economic emancipation of women is crucial to 
a scenario of empowerment and hope. 
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Chapter 2
Emancipation of the  
second generation
The emancipation of the second generation will result in a scenario of 
hope and empowerment in the large cities: this is the core message of our 
story. To accompany this book, we have also made five short film portraits 
entitled ‘Pathways 2 Success’.
The original target group for these films was prospective students, but when we had 
finished the films, we realised that many adults could also relate to them, and that 
they too found them inspiring and thought provoking. You will find a summary of 
each film here, but you can also watch the films through the url, or by scanning the 
qr code with your smart phone. In these films, five people who personify the energy 
generated by the children of migrants tell their story. They are the engines power-
ing processes of change. They are all inspiring, modern pioneers who have swum 
against the tide to shape their own lives. Maybe the difference between them and 
their contemporaries from the individualistic generation of the 1990s is that they 
do not live just for themselves; each one has a message that they want to pass on to 
the next generation. This is how emancipation works in practice. Meet these young 
adults who are shaping change in their community by reading a short version of their 
film portraits. You can also jump to the movies by following the url or scanning the 
qr-code with your smartphone.
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Hamburg
Bilinc Ercan
Bilinc Ercan, 31 years old, born and bred in Hamburg, obtained her PhD  
in law the day before this interview.
M y mother showed me that women can achieve anything. She grew up in a village in 
Anatolia, without a mother. Her broth-
ers were both teachers in the village.  
My mother was the first girl from the 
entire village to go to school. It was a 
school with 300 or 400 boys and she was 
the first girl! She had said ‘I want to go 
to school’, and her brother replied, ‘OK, 
if that is what you really want, I’ll take 
you’. It is so important to have some-
body to support you. After her, more 
and more girls went to school. They saw 
‘OK, a girl can do it too!’ My mother 
was my example, so going to school 
was a given for me. I went to Altona 
secondary school and sat my university 
entrance exams there in 1999.
I realise how in German society, my 
Turkish background makes me deal with 
the fact that I am different. I used to 
sit in the bus to school, thinking ‘Is he 
looking at me because I look different?’ 
It was all in my mind, I have to admit, 
29
but these thoughts were also reinforced 
by several incidents, such as the time 
we were stopped by the police. They 
suddenly appeared and said ‘Can you 
show us your id? You don’t look like you 
live here’. I felt uneasy, discriminated 
against.
We are of Turkish descent, we are the 
third generation. We grew up in this 
country, the country belongs as much 
to us as to anyone else. This also means 
that we identify with this country. But 
German society must also allow us to 
identify with this country. And that is 
what I have set as my goal. I decided to 
study law, because I associate that with 
justice.
I think that it is important for young 
people of migrant descent to free them-
selves from what other people think of 
them. If you have a goal, don’t let nega-
tive thoughts hold you back. If someone 
gives you the feeling you are inferior, 
let go of it, free yourself from it! Just do 
your thing. Don’t take it all too seriously. 
I just went up to my professor and said 
that I wanted to do my PhD. So I started 
and yesterday, I obtained my PhD. You 
can accomplish things that first made 
you wonder ‘How can I ever manage 
this?’ But you can do a lot, if you keep at 
it. You just need people to support you”.
Watch the movie: 
www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/
hamburg
’My mother showed 
me that women can 
achieve anything.’
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Paris
Youness Bourimech
32 years old, owns a company in the Bondy neighbourhood,  
a banlieu of Paris.
T his suburb, Bondy, is my turf.  My parents left Morocco to come here. I grew up in this suburb. 
There was a bakery, a football field and 
a school. That was it, it was my entire 
world. My luck changed when I was 20 
and I met my wife who was living in 
Paris. Only 4 miles from home, lay one 
of the most beautiful cities in the world! 
But I grew up here, and that’s why I’m 
still here. I started in the first class in 
primary school. I was never kept back 
a year, but I was still sent to lower-level 
vocational school. We had no idea what 
kind of professions existed. Here in the 
suburbs, there were only three subjects 
to choose from: sales, marketing and 
secretarial administration. They simply 
fill these three classes with the kids that 
are there. They don’t try to find out what 
talents a kid may have. This is dumb, 
because if a kid pursues a subject that 
he likes, everyone wins – not just the 
child, but the whole society. I wanted to 
become a sport teacher. But then, I went 
to the sport faculty and found out that 
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there were 4,000 applications for just 
400 spaces. Other applicants had the 
right preparatory training, so that was 
difficult.
Then, I set up my first cleaning compa-
ny. My sister did the administration, and 
I took care of the business side. Shortly 
after we started, our customers started 
asking if we could do more. Now I have 
started a breeding ground for business-
es, right here where I grew up, together 
with a friend I grew up with. Yes, in my 
business I work in the service of sport 
one hundred percent. Competitiveness, 
competition, the rules of the game: 
these are things you openly have to 
respect. In sport, religion is not an issue. 
In sport, everyone is the same. You wear 
a T-shirt, shorts, everyone is the same.
I have employees in my company, but 
I call them my partners. We’re in this 
adventure together. Don’t forget where 
you come from, that’s my motto. I never 
forget that I started off cleaning toilets. 
I’d do it again tomorrow, if I had to. 
That’s right, you must not forget where 
you came from. I’m sticking around, 
right here in my neighbourhood. We 
will move up together. We are raising 
standards. We are lucky, because for 
years, this was a terrible neighbour-
hood, totally rundown and very poor. 
It was also full of many nationalities. 
This is valuable, because that’s how the 
world is. This neighbourhood has many 
empty industrial premises. I’m waiting 
it out. Paris is four miles away. We have 
everything here: we are close to the  
motorway, and there is a business air-
port nearby. I have everything here.  
I’m patient, and slowly but surely you 
will see all the things that will be hap-
pening here in ten years.
Watch the movie: 
www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/paris
‘If a kid pursues a 
subject that he likes, 
everyone wins.’
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Halil Karaaslan
24 years old, is a social studies teacher in his hometown Rotterdam.
I  don’t think I had a vision of what I’d be doing in the future, but rather a sense of what I hoped to be doing. 
I teach at Lebanon secondary school, 
with a lot of love and passion. I try to 
pass on what I missed out on when  
I was a pupil. School didn’t motivate  
me to continue studying.
In my adolescence, I was like a little 
philosopher. All kinds of thoughts filled 
my head. I felt somewhat advanced in 
my thinking, I wanted more. The 
awakening came when I realised what  
I needed school for: to accomplish 
what I wanted. I had well-meaning 
friends around me saying, ‘Hey, don’t 
you do enough already?’ In that sense, 
I noticed that friends could also get in 
the way of my goals. I now tell people 
that at certain points in your life, you 
must dare to distance yourself from 
some people. They may be your closest 
friends, even your family. I know for a 
fact that some pupils have families who 
are anything but encouraging. I rather 
missed out on a role model at school. 
What really inspired me was Bruce 
Rotterdam
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Lee and what he accomplished. People 
tend to overlook the fact that Bruce Lee 
was also a philosopher, because he had 
actually studied philosophy. One of his 
quotes that really inspires me is ‘The key 
to immortality is first living a life that is 
worth remembering’. That is what has 
always driven me, whether I can mean 
something for one person, or for ten, 
one thousand or a million. It is a positive 
form of pride, when you can say ‘I can 
leave this world with a sense of peace, 
because I know that I did something 
worthwhile for other people’. Bruce Lee 
acted as a bridge between east and west. 
I have the same idea, I bring people 
together.
I help people to understand each other 
better. This doesn’t mean that they 
always have to agree with each other, 
but that they can understand each oth-
er’s choices. I play a role in this dynam-
ic. I think that it’s important that pupils 
voice their opinions in my class. 
But emotions and feelings are also  
welcome in the classroom. During 
debates – which occur quite often in 
my class – I notice how my background 
allows me to say some things more 
easily than my colleagues can. You can 
only achieve something when you can 
dredge up someone’s deepest feelings. 
This can be very extreme in some cases, 
but if you can grasp that and then enter 
into a dialogue together, that’s when you 
get somewhere”. 
‘I felt somewhat 
advanced in my 
thinking.’
Watch the movie: 
www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/
rotterdam
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I ’m a researcher and I also teach.  I teach students about the role the media and the internet play in 
politics and political movements in 
the Middle East. I now work at Oxford 
University. Well, I would never have 
thought that a Moroccan from East 
Amsterdam would ever have anything to 
do with a place like this. But you grow 
into it, and in doing so you see how the 
psychological barrier, the thought that 
‘this is not for the likes of you’, can be 
overcome.
My father is a typical first-generation 
migrant. He opened his own butcher’s 
shop in Amsterdam. I think that he also 
thought at first that being independent 
and having your own business was not 
for the likes of us. That we were brought 
here to do the dirty work, and that’s how 
the cards are dealt. But he did it.
I did not follow a straight path from 
primary school to academic track  
secondary school to university. I took 
what used to be called a step-by-step 
Amsterdam
Miriyam Aouragh
39 years old, has a PhD in Anthropology. She works in Oxford, England and 
has just won the prestigious Leverhulm research scholarship.
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route. So I worked my way up from the 
very lowest level of secondary edu-
cation. After primary school, I went 
from lower vocational track secondary 
school, to middle vocational education, 
progressing on to higher vocational edu-
cation before finally reaching university.  
I then explored the academic world. 
This journey took at least 10, 15 years. 
This is a common experience for many 
children of migrants. Language defi-
ciencies are often mistaken for a lack 
of intelligence. I had to find out and ex-
plore a lot more for myself. I was lucky 
that during my studies at vu University, 
there was a very good teacher in the 
anthropology department, who made 
me feel that she really believed in me. 
Validation can be very empowering. 
That experience at vu University was 
crucial.
I think that it is important not to put a 
deadline on your dreams. It’s not true 
that you must have everything figured 
out by the time you are 30. Dare to set 
your sights beyond the Netherlands. 
The Netherlands is not the world, it 
isn’t even the centre of Europe. The 
Netherlands is actually just a small 
country and the world doesn’t revolve 
around it. So cross that border. Do 
something out of the ordinary. Later 
on, you’ll look back and say ‘I have done 
something different’. And being different 
from the mainstream is actually rather 
cool”.
Watch the movie: 
www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/
amsterdam
‘Do something out of 
the ordinary.’ 
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I t’s a fact that your background, your family and your family’s network make all the difference. They open 
doors for you. In fact, they don’t just 
open doors – they open up your world.  
I missed out on that, a network of 
people with a background in higher 
education, or with brothers, sisters or 
friends in higher education. I lacked 
that indeed. Fortunately, I received 
encouragement and inspiration from 
my teachers. They set me on the path 
to modern sciences and I graduated in 
mathematical economics. After that,  
I got certified as a genetic lab assistant. 
But then I asked myself – what now?  
I ended up in a school in Antwerp, 
where I taught for two years. During 
that time, I met a couple of Turkish 
entrepreneurs who, along with a few 
young people, had taken the initiative to 
set up an after-school tutoring pro-
gramme. They asked me if I would be 
interested in helping out, as they needed 
a coordinator. That was a very compel-
ling experience for me. You learn to deal 
with people, and you develop leadership 
skills, but in doing so, you also find soul 
Brussels
Muhammet Yilmaz
36 years old, works as a lobbyist in Brussels. 
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mates. These are people in the same 
situation as yourself, who think like you.  
I wish that I’d had that when I was 
young. If so, I would have followed a 
different educational track.
Networking is very important nowa-
days. It does not just happen though 
your study or work. It is also the other 
things that you do. Learn a musical 
instrument, write poems, go mountain 
climbing! Try something different. It will 
help you to overcome psychological bar-
riers. It will also help to broaden your 
network, so that you don’t just stick to 
the people from secondary school and 
university. Instead you will also have 
many other people in your life – people 
with different interests, people who 
can enrich you with their knowledge 
and their experiences. For me, net-
working means making friends. People 
who can help me to solve problems, 
including personal ones. My network 
is broad, really very broad. It can range 
from assistants or interns working at 
the European parliament to a Belgian 
minister. Is this opportunistic? No, most 
definitely not. It’s give and take. If they 
need something, they can also call upon 
me.
When I first got to know my present 
colleague, he had just set up a new com-
pany. He represented 13,000 businesses 
from Turkey and organised exchanges 
and lobbies. Basically, we are trying 
to build a bridge between Ankara and 
Brussels, and between Turkish public 
opinion, the Turkish business world 
and European institutions. I think that 
our generation is a hinge generation. It 
is a generation that will ensure that the 
Belgian-Turkish community finds both 
its identity and its place in society.
Watch the movie: 
www.elitesproject.eu/educational-kit/english/
brussels
‘For me, networking 
means making 
friends.’
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Chapter 3
Education as the key to 
emancipation
In the 1960s and 70s, companies and governments brought migrant workers to 
the large European cities to perform the unskilled work in factories, mines and 
harbours that European workers no longer wanted to do. The most important crite-
ria for recruitment was that the workers must be young, healthy and uneducated. 
The effects of this recruitment strategy can still be felt today. Most first generation 
Turkish, Moroccan, Yugoslavian and Italian migrants had no more than a primary 
school education. The majority of the first generation Turkish and Moroccan women 
who arrived later came from the same villages as their husbands. Many of them had 
never had the opportunity to go to school and were effectively illiterate. Such a low 
level of education is scarcely to be found among their generational peers from the 
European working class; it is usually only to be found in multi-problem families 
where long-term unemployment, and sometimes alcoholism or criminality, are part 
of everyday life, but this is where the comparison ends. Because of their parents’ 
educational level, the children of these migrant workers started life from an extreme-
ly disadvantaged position.
The fiasco caused by thinking ‘they won’t stay for long’
Temporary migration: this was the motto of both employers and the government 
when the labour migrants arrived. As far as they were concerned, the workers were 
here as guests and would leave again. Part of this plan was that the children of 
married workers would grow up in Turkey and Morocco. After all, their father would 
be returning home soon. All European countries had more or less the same policy 
in that regard. In the same period, however, Turkish workers were being actively 
recruited by another country: Australia. A popular joke among Turks at that time 
was that many guest workers thought they were signing up for Austria (Avusturya), 
only to find out that they were bound for Australia (Avustralya). The spelling of the 
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words Austria and Australia in Turkish may be similar, but their migration politics 
were a world apart. In contrast to Austria, guest workers in Australia were allowed 
to take their wives and children with them straight away. This was a logical decision 
from the perspective of an immigration country like Australia: the reasoning was 
that migrants could only really settle in a country – learn the language, invest in and 
build a future – if they were not separated from their family. European countries 
did not see themselves as immigration countries, and delayed for a long time before 
they finally gave permission for migrant workers to be reunited with their wives and 
children. 
The consequences of this choice can still be felt to the present day. Children 
born in Turkey had become teenagers during the eight to ten years they had spent 
waiting. They had gone to school in Turkey and learnt the language there. They were 
brought to western Europe in the middle of puberty and sent to school here with-
out any preparation. The atmosphere of acute crisis that the arrival of these chil-
dren in large numbers caused in schools has been comprehensively described in all 
 European countries. Teachers tried to help these young people as best as they could 
with the limited tools at their disposal. In addition to the huge obstacle of language, 
children entered schools with different levels of knowledge and from a totally differ-
ent school system. 
Europe’s late family reunification policy has exacted a high price. This so-called 
‘in-between generation’ left school early, never learnt to speak the language without 
an accent and often did not stand a chance on the employment market. In many 
regards, they are a lost generation. In Australia, there is practically no such thing as 
an ‘in-between generation’: most young people of Turkish descent went to school 
there from an early age (Inglis 2011).
The balance after fifty years of labour migration
It is now, more than fifty years after the beginning of labour migration, possible 
to draw up the balance for the in-between and second generation. Everywhere in 
Europe politicians seem convinced: integration policy has failed. Inadequate mastery 
of the language, major cultural differences and the low socio-economic position of 
the first generation are pointed to as the causes of the ‘failed integration of the chil-
dren of immigrants’. These are exactly the characteristics which were required of the 
migrants when they were recruited by employers and governments in the first place. 
The major challenges involved in educating children whose parents could offer them 
little or no support are the direct consequence of choices that were made by govern-
ments and employers on the basis of somewhat short-sighted economic motives.
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Having stated this, the question is then whether society has reacted appropriately 
and whether the right methods have been applied to create good educational oppor-
tunities for the children of migrants. It is now possible to make an evaluation of what 
the government could have done: western European countries have taken very varied 
approaches to how the children of migrants enter and progress though the education 
system. This makes international comparisons possible regarding both policy and 
outcomes. It also allows us to accurately pinpoint the countries in  Europe where 
educational integration has been most successful. Where are children of migrants 
doing well and where do they form a marginalised group in the education system? 
To find the answer, we have reversed the usual question: our question is not why 
migrants are not integrating, but why societies either succeed or fail in including 
migrants and their children. 
On the basis of educational outcomes for the Turkish second generation in  Sweden, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland and France, we can rank 
these countries in order. To enable a fair comparison between the different coun-
tries, we have only compared young people from poorly-educated Turkish migrant 
workers’ families. We have deliberately kept the children of political asylum seekers 
(who came to Europe after the coup in Turkey) out of the comparison. Because their 
parents have a different migration history and are generally better educated, includ-
ing them would distort the comparison.
Optimists versus pessimists
The results of the research into the Turkish second generation in Europe reveal that 
many of its members are falling behind others of their age group in educational 
terms (Crul et al. 2012). Many of them have been kept back a year in primary school, 
they are over-represented in lower and middle vocational education and many 
leave education early. All these negative indicators show a clear over-representation 
compared to children whose parents do not have a migrant background. 
At the same time, however, considerable progress has been recorded. In the 1970s 
and 1980s the first encounters with migrant children were a true educational disas-
ter. In the Netherlands, for example, three-quarters of pupils of Turkish descent left 
school early. The situation in other countries was similar. Thirty years on, less than a 
third of this group in the Netherlands leaves school early. In the Netherlands today, 
the group that is following or has followed higher education is the same size as the 
group of early school leavers. An important aspect of this progress is as a result of the 
extra facilities that schools have developed for the children of migrants. However, 
much time was lost before an effective approach was devised. A lot went wrong, 
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particularly in the beginning. For example, funds were used to purchase new mate-
rials for teaching a second language (one’s mother tongue is referred to as one’s first 
language) but there was often no extra training to help teachers work efficiently with 
these tools. 
Through time, most schools have become more successful in finding the right 
tools to tackle language and maths problems. They have also slowly adapted their 
structure to accommodate the arrival of new groups of pupils. Smaller classrooms, 
which have been introduced at many schools with a high proportion of children with 
immigrant backgrounds, allow teachers to give pupils more individual attention. An 
increasing number of children receive extra lessons in their second language during 
extended school hours. Nowadays, auxiliary educational staff from diverse ethnic 
groups are used in many countries to build an extra bridge between the school and 
parents with a migrant background. In short, primary and secondary schools, most 
of which have been working with migrant children for more than thirty years now, 
have made radical adjustments. 
In media discussions about the educational performance of migrant children, the 
glass is often either half empty or half full. Sometimes, the increasing success of the 
second generation is emphasised, while at other times, focus never strays from the 
large group of early school leavers. A chasm has opened up in the debate between 
the optimists and the pessimists. The optimists emphasise the progress that has 
been made, while the pessimists point out the problems. In reality, however, these 
two situations exist side-by-side. This dichotomy is distorting our view of reality. 
By focusing purely on success stories, the optimists are sweeping the problems of a 
significant group of young people under the carpet, but by focusing purely on young 
people at risk, the pessimists are doing a disservice to the growing numbers of young 
people who are succeeding in spite of considerable disadvantages. Both develop-
ments are important to our evaluation of differences in outcomes between countries.
Progress in the second generation is crucial
American research shows that the progress made by the second generation is crucial 
to the generations that follow them. If there is stagnation in the second genera-
tion, there is a greater risk that the third generation will also fail. The feeling that 
 American researchers describe as ‘immigrant optimism’ can disappear if there is a 
sense of failure among the second generation (Kasinitz et al. 2008). The first genera-
tion has taken the risky step of moving to a strange country with the aim of making 
a better life for themselves and their family. If the first generation does not manage 
to achieve this goal, hope is vested in the next generation. The message that many 
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migrants pass on to their children is: ‘Don’t be like us! Get an education, and learn a 
profession so that you don’t have to do unskilled, strenuous or dirty work your entire 
life’ (Coenen 2001). In the interviews, successful young people from the second 
generation described how they were expected to fulfil their family’s dreams. Their 
ambitions are high – in some cases unrealistically so. Those from the second gener-
ation who leave school early cannot generally meet these expectations. The question 
is whether they will pass on an optimistic message about the opportunities offered by 
education to their children. It seems more likely that their own failed school career 
will have made them sceptical about education as a vehicle for social mobility. Their 
low social standing gives the third generation a particularly disadvantaged starting 
position. These children will grow up in the poorest neighbourhoods and go to the 
worst schools. This potentially negative scenario illustrates why the success of the 
second generation is so crucially important for the future. 
Leaving school early
We compare the school outcomes of the Turkish second generation using the larg-
est European comparative study into second generation migrant youth in  European 
cities. In the ties project ten thousand young adults aged between 18 and 35 
were interviewed. These young people were ethnic Turks, Moroccans and former 
Yugoslavians from the second generation and a comparison group of young people 
whose parents were born in the eight participating European countries (www.tiespro-
ject.eu). The second generation respondents all have the same starting position (all 
born in Europe) and all come from labour migrant families with parents who have 
only attained a low level of education. In each country, the results were collected 
in the two cities with the largest Turkish population. These cities are Amsterdam 
and Rotterdam in the Netherlands, Brussels and Antwerp in Belgium, and Paris and 
Strasbourg in France. Two hundred and fifty young people from the Turkish second 
generation were interviewed in each city. 
We start our systematic international comparison with early school leavers and 
then compare the group of students in higher education. In Europe, there is a great 
deal of focus on early school leavers, and rightly so, as there is a clear correla-
tion between leaving school early and unemployment, criminality and poverty. In 
 European statistics, early school leavers are clearly defined as young people whose 
highest educational achievement is a certificate of lower vocational education. Using 
this definition reveals huge differences between countries. 
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Girls sometimes leave school as early as the age of 16 in Germany and Austria. They 
are then expected to help out in the home. This prepares them for their role as a 
housewife. At this young age, the girls have little room to break free from traditional 
gender patterns. The majority of these girls will never enter the labour market.
Many second generation Turks in Germany 
and Austria encounter problems obtaining 
a work experience place. This is how they 
then become the earliest school leavers in 
Europe.
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Turkish second generation with low-educated parents:
Early school leavers
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The results are depicted in the infographic on the previous page for each country, 
but please note that these outcomes were produced on the basis of two cities taken 
together.
At almost a third, the number of early school leavers among the Turkish second 
generation in Belgium, Germany and Austria is very high. The Turkish second gener-
ation in France, Switzerland and Sweden achieve a much higher score, according to 
the eu definition. Our comparative analyses showed that the migrant-related policy 
adopted by the different countries did not, in fact, play a decisive role. In France, for 
example, girls are forbidden to wear headscarves at school, while they are allowed to 
do so in Germany. Such matters may affect how welcome the children of migrants 
feel at school, but it is clear that they do not influence whether or not they drop out 
early or go on to higher education. We have a prosaic explanation: the gaping differ-
ences are mainly the result of how education is organised for the entire population in 
the different countries. Despite European unity, educational opportunities still vary 
greatly from country to country. 
The Netherlands is one of the countries with a rather high percentage of early 
school leavers. This is caused by a strange anomaly in the transition to middle voca-
tional training in the Netherlands. While the most successful and studious pupils 
remain within the structured learning environment of secondary school until they 
are eighteen, the pupils with the lowest results and the greatest learning difficul-
ties are discharged from their familiar secondary school environment and moved to 
large, complex educational institutions for middle vocational training at the age of 
sixteen. The timing of this crucial transition coincides with the end of their compul-
sory full-time education. The important guiding role played by teachers who have 
known the youngsters since they were twelve is over: instead these students and their 
parents must take responsibility for themselves. Consequently, it is mainly the lowest 
middle vocational tracks (mbo 1 and 2) that suffer the highest levels of absenteeism 
and an enormous drop-out rate (Crul et al. 2008). 
Many Turkish second generation pupils in German and Austrian cities leave school 
after obtaining their Hauptschule diploma (comparable to the two lowest tracks of 
secondary education). Leaving school at the age of 15 or 16 makes them the youngest 
school leavers in Europe. Hauptschule pupils are supposed to go on to a work expe-
rience place, in which students spend most of their time obtaining work experience 
within a company. It is difficult for many young people of the Turkish second gener-
ation to obtain such a work experience place, and so they leave education altogether 
at a very early age. Their main problem is that they, with the support of their parents, 
are responsible for obtaining their own work experience place, and it is often diffi-
cult to find an employer who is prepared to accept them. Their parents usually do 
not have the right contacts to be able to help much, and discrimination by employ-
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ers also plays an important role. Because the transition to the employment market 
depends so heavily on access to a work experience placement, leaving school early 
has far-reaching consequences. It often results in boys experiencing long periods of 
unemployment and girls not entering the employment market at all.
In France and Sweden, the group with the lowest educational qualifications stays 
in the education system for at least two or three years longer than their peers in 
Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. In France, they obtain a bep or cap diploma 
for vocational education, while in Sweden, they obtain a gymnasium school diplo-
ma (Swedish gymnasium has many more vocational subjects, and is therefore not 
the same as Dutch gymnasium) at the age of eighteen. They are not therefore early 
school leavers according to the eu definition. These are, however, very general diplo-
mas, and only provide access to unskilled work. In Sweden and France, pupils are 
generally expected to go on to post-secondary or university education after obtain-
ing their lyceum or gymnasium diploma. Young people who do not continue their 
education have no practical work experience and employers regard them as being 
virtually uneducated. 
It doesn’t have to be this way!
The European comparison shows that early school leaving is accompanied by a 
problematic transition (usually at the end of compulsory schooling) to the next 
educational level. In nearly all cases, something goes wrong in the transition from 
lower secondary education to further education (with or without a work experi-
ence placement). One country that has made efforts to improve this is Switzerland, 
where many young second generation Turks follow lower vocational education. As 
in  Germany, they often do not manage to find a work experience placement on their 
own. In  Switzerland, however, these young people are not just left to their own devic-
es, but are enrolled in a Brückenangbot course, a ‘bridging’ period that lasts one or 
two years, depending on their needs. These youngsters receive intensive training and 
coaching to help them find a work experience placement. The Brückenangbot solu-
tion is surprisingly simple. This bridging period works very effectively and the pupils 
go on to find a work experience placement relatively easily. 
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The vm2 experiment in the Netherlands was also launched with this objective 
in mind. vm2 is an educational route that lasts six years. It combines four years of 
lower secondary education (vmbo) with a two-year middle vocational course that is 
intended to result in a qualification that will provide access to the job market (mbo-
2 diploma). vm2 schools provide a seamless educational route, without transitions, 
within the structured environment of secondary school. In short, it is comparable to 
the learning environment that is already available to the most academically success-
ful pupils in the Netherlands. The first evaluation study (2011-2012) shows that it 
works. Four times as many young people who followed a vm2 education obtained a 
start qualification within the set period as young people from the control group who 
followed the usual educational route (Schoonhoven et al. 2012). 
A high percentage of early school leavers is not some kind of unavoidable phenom-
enon which just happens to affect us. Everywhere in Europe, attempts have been 
made to help the children of migrants with learning disadvantages fit into the school 
system. In countries where either the facilities on offer (Brückenangebot) or the 
school system (vm2 schools) have been adjusted to the needs of the pupils, consid-
erable progress has been achieved. 
The children of migrants represent the most vulnerable group in the education 
system. Their drop-out rates are the first indication that the system is failing.  Tackling 
faults in the system will also help other vulnerable groups whose problems are less 
visible. A quarter of Hauptschule (lower vocational education) pupils of German 
origin also fail to find an internship placement: a Brückenangebot would also provide 
a solution to their problems.
Successful against all expectations
Considering that these young people all started off in the same position (all born 
in Europe), and grew up in similar Turkish working class families, the results are 
very different. The most striking problem in Germany is the extremely low degree 
of social mobility, with children advancing their social status very little from that of 
their parents. In comparison, the situation in France and Sweden looks spectacular. 
But why are these differences so immense? The divergence begins with nursery 
school and the age at which children go to primary school. In France, the  Turkish 
second generation youngsters in our study had already been attending nursery 
school (Maternelle) at two or three years of age. In Austria, children do not, on aver-
age, enter a learning environment until three years later. The Turkish second gener-
ation youngsters in Austria spoke fluent Turkish when they entered primary school 
at the age of six, but scarcely any German. The Turkish children in France spoke 
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= 5% who followed pre-university 
education at secondary school
= 5% in higher 
education
In France, all children attend 
Maternelle (Kindergarten) from 
age 2 or 3 where they learn 
French as a second language.
Turkish-Austrian kids start 
school latest, at the age of 6, 
and are selected earliest, at the 
age of 10.
Belgium
Germany
France
Netherlands
Austria
Switzerland
Sweden
Studio Annelies Vlasblom
Figure 5
Turkish second generation with low-educated parents: percentage in  
higher education and percentage that followed pre-university education  
at secondary school 
48
French fluently when they started primary school, because they had already learnt it 
at nursery school. Children in Germany and Austria only spend half days at school, 
while in France, children stay at school all day. The German and Austrian education 
systems select children for further education at a very early age. Children who start 
school at the age of six are selected for either vocational education or pre-university 
education at the age of ten. So, in contrast to other countries, not only do Turkish 
second generation children in Germany and Austria enter school with the greatest 
language developmental delay, but they also have the least time to catch up. This 
explains why only 11 and 18% respectively of children in these countries go on to 
follow secondary education that provides access to university later on. Opposed to 
this in Sweden, Belgium and France, about half of the Turkish second generation 
follow an academic track. 
In Austria, some young people enter higher vocational education after middle 
vocational education by an indirect route. In Germany this is almost unheard of. In 
our study, we found practically no one who had managed to enter higher education 
by way of lower vocational education. The system is virtually impenetrable. Therefore 
the fate of most second generation Turkish youngsters in Germany is sealed at the 
age of ten. 
Germany fortunately is also the country which is currently implementing the most 
far-reaching reforms in education. In many of its constituent states, great efforts 
are being made with regard to nursery education. An increasing number of primary 
and secondary schools are switching to providing lessons all day. In Berlin and other 
cities, there are now Gesamtschulen, in which Hauptschule and Realschule (and, 
sometimes, Gymnasium) are now being housed in one building; something which 
will make it easier to switch from one form of education to another. 
What is striking in Belgium is the high percentage in pre-university education 
and the low numbers who actually go on to higher education. This typically Belgian 
phenomenon is known as ‘the waterfall system’. The early start at nursery school 
(two or three years of age) is favourable for those entering pre-university education 
and in the first part of secondary education. The problems for the young people of 
the Turkish second generation do not usually start until the latter half of secondary 
school. Young people who cannot achieve the scores (based on the average score) 
required for pre-university education (tso and aso) are often advised to choose a 
lower stream. The waterfall system forces twice as many Turkish second generation 
youngsters as young people of Belgian descent to drop down into lower vocational 
education. It appears that a crucial factor is the amount of practical support that 
parents can give with school work. Many Turkish parents are unable to give adequate 
support. 
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In The Netherlands, we see an opposite trend: upstreaming. The Dutch practice 
of selecting children at an early age is partially compensated for by giving them the 
opportunity to go on to higher education. The majority (three quarters) of young 
people from the Turkish second generation enter lower vocational education  (vmbo) 
at the age of twelve. Many of these young people continue on through middle voca-
tional education (mbo) to higher vocational education (hbo, part of the tertiary 
education system). This means that the Netherlands and Austria are Europe’s cham-
pion “upstreamers”. Half of all Turkish second generation youngsters who enter 
higher education, do so through this indirect route (Crul et al. 2008).
Whenever possible, children of migrants seize the second chance that upstream-
ing affords them with both hands. They take this route twice as often as the children 
of Dutch parents. This is a path which demands a great deal of perseverance and 
ambition, because it takes three years longer to cross the finishing line. 
Punished for your low-educated parents 
As well as the fact that the various school systems offer different opportunities and 
throw up different obstacles, each school system also requires a different level of 
involvement from parents. The system of half-day schooling in Germany and Austria, 
for example, is severely disadvantageous to children whose parents cannot provide 
any help with language and maths. Teachers in Germany and Austria expect parents 
to actively help their children with their homework and to encourage them to read 
and write in German. These are all tasks that Turkish parents of the first generation 
are only able to fulfil to a limited extent. Nowhere in Europe is the negative impact of 
this lack of parental help on children’s school results as marked as in Germany and 
Austria. In other words, in no other country are children of Turkish parents punished 
so harshly for having low-educated parents. If, as a second generation  Turkish child 
in Germany or Austria, your parents cannot check your homework, your chances of 
gaining access to pre-university education (Gymnasium) are practically non-existent 
(6% and 10% respectively). 
In sharp contrast to this, four out of ten Turkish second generation children in 
France, whose parents are no better able to check their homework, do go on to 
pre-academic education. 
When the Swedish model is analysed in more detail, we see that there is, in fact, a 
negative relationship between the help and efforts of the parents and the educational 
results of their children. In Sweden, parents are not expected to provide practical 
support to their children: this is provided at school. We discovered that in Sweden, 
children with learning difficulties received help from their parents more often, and 
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indirect route, through upstreaming, to higher education 
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that these parents had more contact with teachers. Further analysis revealed that 
parents do not come into the picture in Sweden unless the child has serious learn-
ing difficulties or behavioural problems. Only then are they required to make extra 
efforts or provide more support. For an average pupil in Sweden, parental support is 
not a pre-condition for entering pre-university secondary education. 
In addition to practical help with homework, school success is also determined by 
knowledge of the school system. The Dutch secondary school system is one of the 
most complicated in Europe, with no fewer than six different routes. Only the two 
highest of these give direct access to higher education. In principal, lower vocation-
al education at the highest level (vmbo theoretical) can also allow indirect access 
to higher education, through middle vocational training (mbo), but the chances of 
actually succeeding by this route is three times lower than through the direct route. 
Not all six of the school routes are represented in every secondary school. If a pupil 
goes to a school that only provides lower vocational tracks, their chances of going 
on to the types of secondary education that offer access to university decline signif-
icantly. If a child chooses the wrong school, they are likely to take much longer to 
reach higher education; or what is more usually the case, they will not enter higher 
education at all. Knowledge and insight when choosing a school are therefore of 
crucial importance. It is hardly surprising that things often go wrong for the children 
of less educated migrant parents. 
The degree of help and support expected from parents also plays an important 
role in whether or not a child leaves school early. The strongest effects of this can be 
seen in Germany and Austria. If parents in these countries are barely able to discuss 
school with their children or have no contact with teachers, there is a 50% chance 
that their children will leave school early! 
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Snakes and ladders 
Every school system has factors which either help or hinder children – like snakes 
and ladders (Crul et al. 2009). These are often the characteristics which will deter-
mine whether or not young people from the Turkish second generation will be 
successful. They are often the very same characteristics that obstruct the progress of 
children from other working class families. With migrant children, however, these 
problems become hugely magnified: not allowing children to go to school until the 
age of six is not good for children from working class families, but it is even worse 
for the children of migrants. For them, it is crucially important that they acquire 
their second language at an early age. Without pre-school education, the children 
of labour migrants start off with an enormous language development delay. Half 
school days and early selection only ensure that they are at a clear disadvantage by 
the age of ten. If, however, school systems offer extra opportunities, the children of 
migrants make much more use of them. Young people of the Turkish and Moroccan 
second generation in the Netherlands enter higher education through the longer 
indirect route of vocational education much more often than children from native 
Dutch families. These children of labour migrants must persevere for longer and be 
prepared to invest more in their education. 
What all the educational factors which work out positively for the second gener-
ation have in common is that they prepare these youngsters for the next stage of 
their school career. Attending pre-school, or getting off to an early start at nursery 
school, prepares them for primary school by improving their second language skills. 
Postponing selection gives them more time to catch up before they have to sit the 
crucial examinations which will give them access to further education. The alterna-
tive, longer route by means of vocational education, gives talented pupils who were 
selected too early extra time to catch up. The general rule seems to be that investing 
extra time at the beginning (early start at nursery school or postponing selection) 
removes the need for significantly more time-consuming investments later on in the 
school career (for example, by upstreaming).
Our international comparison has turned prevailing ideas about the conditions for 
successful integration upside down: the strong emphasis in the integration debate on 
the characteristics of parents appears to only partly explain why children succeed or 
fail at school. The school system is at least as important, if not more so. The differ-
ences in outcomes from country to country are often greater than the differences in 
outcomes between pupils of native parentage and pupils of migrant parentage within 
one country. 
This insight is important for our new perspective on integration. It is only possible 
to ‘work on’ parents to a limited extent. Efforts to educate uneducated parents from 
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the first generation, or to teach them the national language, have had only limit-
ed results. We can, however, on the basis of international comparison, adjust our 
school system to give children of low-educated migrants an equal chance of success. 
Each country has specific problems to tackle. The dramatically low rate of young 
people entering pre-university education in Austria can only be effectively reversed 
if children enter pre-school education at a much younger age. Practices in France, 
where children start nursery school at the age of two, clearly have a positive effect. 
 Vocational education in Germany would benefit from creating more varied oppor-
tunities to progress to higher vocational education, as is the case in the Netherlands. 
Dutch vocational education, in its turn, could take a leaf from Switzerland’s book, 
and tackle drop-out rates in mbo-1 and 2 by coaching young people to find work 
experience placements. Even countries that come out of the comparison relatively 
well could still learn a great deal from the practices in other countries. An example 
of this is Sweden, which achieves high scores in every international study of school 
results. It is striking, however, that many pupils who have followed pre-university 
education do not go on to higher education and, in fact, end up in low-skilled jobs. 
For these young people, the German system of work experience placements could be 
an important supplement to the Swedish school system, which at present pays little 
attention to the employment market. 
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Chapter 4
Success in the  
labour market
Today, between half and two thirds of the young people under 18 in the largest 
European cities have a migrant background. The cities that succeed in harnessing 
the potential of these young people will have a tremendous competitive edge over 
the cities which fail to do so. The future of cities is therefore closely linked to the 
socio-economic emancipation of the second and third generation.
In the next few years, the baby boom generation – born immediately after the 
Second World War – will be retiring from the employment market in massive 
numbers. The second generation will take over a significant proportion of their jobs, 
especially in the large cities. The sociologist Richard Alba speaks of non zero sum 
mobility (Alba 2009): the children of migrants will fill the vacancies appearing in the 
employment market without the need to compete with established employees. Are 
there already examples of countries in Europe where such an optimistic scenario is 
unfolding? 
In a city like Stockholm or Paris, this move into the middle and higher sectors of 
the employment market is already visible. Berlin may be a world city, like Paris, but 
as we have already seen, it is extremely difficult to enter the professional job market 
through higher education. Clearly, the likelihood of an optimistic scenario in the 
employment market is strongly related to the educational opportunities offered to 
the second generation.
From checkout girl to branch manager!
Early school leavers from the second generation were the first to enter the employ-
ment market because they had spent the least time in school. These early school 
leavers have dominated perceptions of the second generation for a long time. Often 
these young people went to work in large supermarkets, either operating the till or 
filling shelves. Delivering pizzas on a souped-up scooter was a cooler alternative for 
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boys, but all of these jobs were the kind of work that reinforced the stereotypical 
image of low-educated migrant youth. 
Today, the better educated of the second generation, who studied for longer, are 
entering the employment market. Not only is the checkout girl of Moroccan descent, 
but the manager probably is too. In municipal agencies, women of migrant parentage 
are no longer just the cleaners, young second generation women – with or with-
out a headscarf – are increasingly to be found behind the counters. There are some 
examples of young people from the second generation in top jobs, but they are still 
few and far between. Highly-educated young people from the second generation 
are mainly to be found in certain sectors: ict, the business sector, welfare and the 
legal sector. Young lawyers, account managers and policy assistants of Turkish or 
 Moroccan descent increasingly form the backbone of the staff in the offices at the 
centre of power in Europe’s major cities. 
Differences between the countries with regard to positions  
in the labour market
In the chapter on education, we gave an overview of the results based on countries. 
In this chapter, we will present the results for each city. In contrast to education, the 
situation in the employment market varies greatly between small and large cities. We 
will only focus here on the capital cities of six countries. 
The table on the next page shows the group of young adults with a job at the high-
est level (professional position). The educational differences that we saw between 
countries were also evident here. The percentage of young people with a professional 
job is three times as high in Paris (25%) and Stockholm (20%) as it is in Berlin (8%).
The differences visible in the job market are less pronounced than might have been 
expected on the basis of educational achievement. To recap: six to seven times as 
many children enter higher education in France and Sweden as in Germany. This 
smaller difference can partially be explained by the fact that many of the second 
generation youngsters in our study in France and Sweden are still studying – students 
study for longer in these countries – and have yet to enter the employment market. 
The differences between the countries will therefore increase in the future. This, 
however, is not the only explanation. In France and Sweden, where many people 
have a certificate of higher education, such a certificate does not have the same value 
as it does in Germany, where fewer people follow a university education. Therefore, 
young educated people from the second generation face much stiffer competition in 
France and Sweden. In such a situation, it is often the second generation youngsters 
who lose out when they apply for a job that fits their qualifications.  
Brussels
Amsterdam
Stockholm
Paris
Berlin
Vienna
In Amsterdam, almost half of second-generation 
Turkish professionals work in a managerial 
position.
A significant middle class is developing 
among the second generation in Paris, 
Stockholm and Amsterdam.
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
Studio Annelies Vlasblom
Figure 7
Turkish second generation with low-educated parents: 
percentage with professional jobs
57
Because of this, many of them must accept work for which they are over-qualified. 
The Turkish second generation ends up in a wide variety of jobs, depending on 
the character and opportunities of the national or urban employment market. In 
Sweden, for example, many highly educated women from the Turkish second gener-
ation work for the government, because this country has a comprehensive welfare 
state, where the care and welfare sectors offer many employment opportunities. In 
France, a country with a much smaller welfare state, women from the Turkish second 
generation work in the commercial sector much more often than in Sweden. In the 
Netherlands, the image of Turkish second generation professionals is largely deter-
mined by their high levels of participation in higher vocational education. Members 
of the second generation in the Netherlands therefore occupy professions requiring 
a university education, such as medicine, economics or psychology, much less often 
than their peers in France or Sweden. 
The members of the Turkish second generation working at the bottom of the 
employment market vary greatly, both with regard to their numbers and the type of 
job they do. It is striking how often male early school leavers in Strasbourg end up 
in the construction industry. Every country seems to have its own, specific, Turkish 
niches. It is noticeable, for example, that their counterparts in Stockholm often work 
in the security sector or as taxi drivers. In Belgium, low-educated men often work 
in the Turkish trade sector. Not only do they serve in Turkish shops, but they may 
often own a small supermarket or restaurant. In Amsterdam, there is clearly a niche 
for low-educated boys handling baggage and freight traffic at Schiphol airport. It 
is heavy work with irregular hours, but it pays relatively well. These different niche 
sectors typically appear to be a Turkish safety net for boys who have not done well at 
school, and access to these jobs is usually through a close Turkish network.
We will now zoom in to take a closer look at Turkish second generation youngsters 
in three European cities. The wide range of their positions in the job market illus-
trates how the opportunities offered to the second generation have had an impact 
on the development of the entire Turkish community within each city. Every country 
seems to have created its own much commented on ‘integration problems in the 
employment market’ by producing its own particular brand of this problem through 
its education system and employment market. 
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Stockholm
The positive effects of high university entrance rates are clearly visible in Stockholm. 
One in four young people from the Turkish second generation work in well-paid 
professional jobs. Some even work at management level, and are in charge of staff. 
Others work as engineers or university-educated teachers. In other words, a distinct 
Turkish-Swedish middle class is developing in Stockholm. 
The situation in Stockholm is also typified by a significant group of young people 
from the Turkish second generation who only have a Gymnasium diploma. Some 
of them do relatively well in administrative jobs or semi-skilled sales positions. The 
greatest variety can be seen among young people who have mainly followed voca-
tional subjects at Gymnasium. Some of them do technical jobs for which they receive 
further training, or complete a short extra course to train as a nurse or dental assis-
tant. Another group does not engage in further training or education. This group 
often finds work in the security branch or in basic sales positions in supermarkets 
or shops, not using their vocation-oriented Gymnasium diploma in the job market. 
Amsterdam
Most of the Turkish parents of the second generation in Amsterdam performed 
heavy, unskilled work. Many of the fathers worked in the Ford factory in  Amsterdam 
and a significant group of mothers were cleaners. Among the children of these 
parents, we found only one woman who worked as a cleaner and only one in twenty 
of the men worked in a factory. There is, therefore, a world of difference between 
the working lives of the Turkish second generation in Amsterdam and those of their 
parents. 
The Turkish second generation in the Netherlands is strongly represented in high-
er vocational education (hbo). This explains their high concentration in professions 
to which this qualification gives access. They often work in the youth, welfare and 
education sectors. They are primary and secondary school teachers, counsellors in 
supporting positions in schools or are employed in parent and child centres. The 
health care sector is also a very popular choice. One in ten of these working second 
generation Turkish women is a chemist, medical or dental assistant or a nurse. 
The Turkish second generation women employed in these sectors often work with 
children or patients with a migrant background. The growing numbers of pupils, 
patients and clients with a migrant background using the education, health care and 
welfare systems is an added reason for employing these second generation profes-
sionals. They possess extra language and cultural skills which are enormously useful 
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to such organisations. The participation of these women in the job market is there-
fore of great social importance. 
Men perform a much broader range of jobs, very different to the jobs performed 
by women. It is noticeable how often well-educated men from the Turkish second 
generation work in occupations such as consultancy, publication management or 
software engineering. They frequently earn sizeable incomes, usually much higher 
than those of the highly-educated women.
Berlin
The high incidence of Turkish second generation women working in the youth, 
welfare and education sectors in Amsterdam and Stockholm is not to be found in 
Berlin. Only one in ten of the women working in Berlin are to be found in these 
sectors. Indirectly, this means that these sectors lack the specific expertise they bring 
to their work. The most commonly found profession amongst Turkish women in 
Berlin is that of hairdresser. One in eight working women from the second genera-
tion can be found in this profession. This is possibly the best indication of the differ-
ence between their position and the position of Turkish second generation women in 
Stockholm and Amsterdam. The number of women in the middle category is much 
smaller than in the other two cities, and those working in the more prestigious jobs 
in Berlin can be counted on the fingers of one hand. 
Turkish second generation men are much more likely to follow in their father’s 
footsteps than second generation men in Amsterdam or Stockholm. Three out of ten 
Turkish second generation men in Berlin work in a factory, in the building trades or 
in municipal horticulture. Together with salesmen in shops and staff in the hospital-
ity industry, they make up half to two thirds of the male working population. Only 
a small group of men have achieved economic advancement, often through trade, 
especially by selling mobile phones or other electronic goods. 
Most Turkish-
Swedish women 
work full-time. 
Paris Stockholm
Amsterdam Brussels
Berlin Vienna
= 5%
In Germany, the majority of 
Turkish-German women do not enter 
the employment market at all.
Studio Annelies Vlasblom
Figure 8
Turkish second generation women with low-educated parents  
who are not active in the employment market
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Emancipation through the job market 
The overwhelming majority of Turkish second generation women (79% and 80%) in 
Paris and Stockholm works. And they usually work full-time, particularly in Sweden. 
In contrast to this 43% of the women in Berlin and 42% in Vienna do not participate 
in the job market at all. The differences are even greater when we look at women 
with children. In Stockholm, having children has scarcely any effect on their partic-
ipation in the employment market, but in Germany and Austria the impact is huge: 
two thirds of second-generation women with young children do not have a paid job. 
They care for their husband and children and live the same life as their mothers in 
many ways. 
How can these immense differences between countries be explained? In  Germany 
and Austria, public debate points to conservative attitudes within the Turkish 
community regarding the role of women. But one only has to look at the differences 
between the countries to realise that this argument does not hold. If it is correct, why 
do so many women work in France and Sweden?
The most likely explanation appears to lie in how child care is organised within 
a country. Here also, the negative characteristics of the general facilities in a coun-
try have a stronger impact on the second generation. The much more conservative 
welfare arrangements regarding work and income in Germany and Austria exclude 
second generation Turkish women from the employment market even more so than 
they do less educated women of native parentage. Or, to turn the argument around, 
progressive arrangements in Sweden and France are enabling second generation 
women to break out of conservative role patterns within the Turkish community – 
and these women are grasping this opportunity with both hands. 
In Germany and Austria, the combination of inadequate child-care facilities 
for young children and school days finishing at 1 pm at primary school seriously 
obstructs participation in the job market. Another important factor is the relatively 
low level of education found in Turkish second generation women in Germany and 
Austria in comparison with other countries, typified by them leaving school at a very 
early age. Girls, who sometimes leave school at the age of sixteen, are immediately 
put to work by their mothers doing family chores. This is seen as a practical prepa-
ration for their future role as a wife. This means that from an early age, these girls 
have little opportunity to break out of this traditional pattern. In most cases, they 
never enter the job market. This is an important difference compared to the other 
countries.
The Swedish child care system is the most favourable for Turkish second genera-
tion women and, as a result, the overwhelming majority of them are active in the job 
market. In Sweden, as much as possible is done to ensure that women, even those 
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with very young children, can work. After all, the extensive Swedish welfare system 
can only be funded if both men and women work full-time. This childcare policy 
has multiple benefits: young children benefit from early immersion in the Swedish 
language and early interaction with children of Swedish descent, while at the same 
time, women are emancipating themselves through work. State-financed childcare 
effectively pays for itself, and offers a channel for mobility for the second generation 
and their children.
In the Netherlands, parents have to pay most of the costs of childcare themselves. 
The income from a part-time job on the minimum wage is scarcely enough to  cover 
the cost of childcare. Only one Dutch-Turkish woman with young children and 
 without higher educational qualifications from our study chose to work. The job 
market participation percentages for Turkish second generation women with chil-
dren in the Netherlands are therefore closer to those of Germany and Austria than 
to Sweden. 
Working married women make the difference!
Up to now, we have mainly looked at the individual social mobility of men and 
women of the second generation. We will now extend our view to include families. 
The degree to which both partners have paid work varies greatly from country to 
country. 
The young Turkish-Swedish families in Stockholm are the ones who most often 
have a double income, with both partners working in more than two thirds of the 
cases. Social mobility in large cities is increasingly determined by the family income 
earned jointly by both partners. The degree to which Turkish women enter the job 
market is therefore decisive for the income situation: it determines the disposable 
income and the amount which can be spent on luxury goods, whether the children 
in the family have their own computer, and the area in which they can buy or rent a 
house.
While the Turkish second generation in Stockholm opts for the Scandinavian 
model of double earners, the majority of the Turkish second generation in Berlin 
and Vienna ‘chooses’ the traditional model of the male breadwinner. The trend in 
the other countries is that the man works full-time, while the woman works part-
time. The most advantageous financial position is, not surprisingly, a Turkish 
second generation woman who works full-time and has a working partner. In the 
Netherlands, this yields, on average, a net monthly income of €2,700. Such an income 
gives access to the middle class of urban society. Net family income drops by about 
€1,200 per month if the woman does not work. This is a gigantic difference! We 
Family income drops by a net average 
of €1200 if the woman does not work.
no income 
from work
both partners 
have a paid job
1 income 
from work
Amsterdam Berlin Paris Stockholm Vienna Zurich
Studio Annelies Vlasblom
Figure 9
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found the same trend in France, Austria and Sweden, countries strongly variant in 
many other respects. In short, working women make a real difference. 
A higher joint income enables families to improve their position in the housing 
market. Second generation families in which both partners work are more likely 
to own their house and live in a middle-class neighbourhood. The nature of their 
mobility in the housing market is partly determined by local or national housing 
policy. Double earners in Amsterdam often buy a new apartment accessible to start-
ers in the housing market in a typical migrant neighbourhood. The opportunity to 
do so is facilitated by the policy of large-scale urban renovation in these Amsterdam 
neighbourhoods. In contrast, double earners in Stockholm are leaving similar tradi-
tionally migrant neighbourhoods, which lack high-quality, affordable housing, and 
are renting or buying apartments in more mixed middle class neighbourhoods. In 
Berlin, a higher family income provides the opportunity to move to larger and better 
maintained rented homes. In Belgium, the first generation often bought their own 
homes, as they had to prove that they had ‘suitable living space’ in order to quali-
fy for family reunification. The main disadvantage of these homes now is that they 
are often located in poor migrant neighbourhoods. The upwardly mobile second 
generation is choosing to leave these neighbourhoods and buy a house in the mixed 
neighbourhoods on the edge of the city. 
In all cases, upward mobility in the housing market means the children of the 
second generation will have a better starting position: they are much more likely 
to have their own room, live in a safer neighbourhood and go to the mixed schools 
which achieve better educational results. By contributing to the family income, work-
ing mothers are ensuring that the third generation has the opportunity to escape 
from poor migrant neighbourhoods and schools with poor performance rates.
Discrimination in the labour market 
Unlike the first generation, the second generation was born, bred and educated in 
Europe. So in theory they should not really encounter any extra obstacles to find-
ing a job. Unfortunately, reality does not bear this out. In all the countries stud-
ied, members of the second generation are typically to be found working in jobs for 
which they are over-qualified, and are more likely to be unemployed than young 
people of native parentage, even if they are exactly the same age and have the same 
qualifications.
We show a few of the most striking results here. In Germany, young people of 
the Turkish second generation (25-29) who have completed vocational education 
and a trainee internship are found in unskilled occupations twice as often as young 
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people with a German background of the same age and level of education. In the 
Netherlands, highly-educated young people from the Turkish second generation are 
unemployed four times as often as young people in the same age group of Dutch 
descent with the same level of education. In Belgium, highly educated young people 
of native parentage work in jobs that match their qualifications twice as often as 
young Turkish-Belgians of the same age and with the same qualifications. In Sweden 
young people from the Turkish second generation with a Gymnasium diploma are 
unemployed five times as often as young people of Swedish parentage with exactly 
the same diploma. And young early school leavers of native parentage in Austria find 
skilled work twice as often as young second generation Turks with the same basic 
level of education. 
There is increasing, credible evidence of racism and discrimination toward the 
young people of the second generation. Several studies have shown that when 
application letters and cvs, identical in every respect apart from the name being 
changed, were sent, Peter was invited for an interview, but Youssef was not. 
Using this method, occupational psychologist Eva Darous discovered that candidates 
whose name did not sound Dutch had 22% less chance of selection than candidates 
with a Dutch-sounding name. 
In large cities, employers in the bottom segment of the job market are finding it 
more difficult to refuse young people of migrant parentage because they are, quite 
simply, all that is available on the labour market. Unfortunately, this option to exclude 
is still open to employers at the top end of the employment market. It is dispiriting 
and shocking to conclude that this means it is precisely the most successful and 
dedicated young people from the second generation who are being confronted with 
discrimination most often. 
Half of the young people of the Turkish second generation in the ties study report-
ed that they had experienced discrimination when looking for a job. Women wearing 
a headscarf occupy a special position: they are more often unemployed than women 
who do not wear a headscarf, and reported experiencing discrimination twice as 
often when looking for a job. The figures for reported incidents of discrimination are 
underestimated rather than overestimated. In-depth interviews with highly educat-
ed young people from the second generation show that most professionals are reluc-
tant to attribute rejection to discrimination (Rezaï et al. 2012). 
Why is so little attention paid to this problem? There is much argument about the 
lower educational performance of children of migrants in many countries. Indeed it 
is often cited as the most important factor for claiming that the integration policy has 
failed. In comparison, the discussion of discrimination in the employment market is 
peculiarly half-hearted. The very final taboo in the integration debate would appear 
to be the discussion of discrimination and racism. 
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Increasing unemployment 
The increase in unemployment among young people of migrant parentage repre-
sents a major unknown factor for the future. The relatively moderate unemploy-
ment figures from the ties survey provide a picture of a given point in time, exactly 
at the start of the financial crisis. Since then, the unemployment figures have risen 
dramatically. In the Netherlands 1 in 3 young people of Turkish or Moroccan descent 
are currently unemployed. Their numbers have tripled within the space of five years 
(Forum 2012). 
In comparison to the other countries, the situation in France is the most worrying. 
Even at the time of the ties survey, considering the relatively high education level of 
the Turkish second generation in France, unemployment within the group was very 
high at 16%. In no other country is the transition from school to work as problematic 
as in France. This is not just a problem for young people of migrant parentage, youth 
unemployment for those of native parentage is among the highest in Europe. Many 
young French-Turks are unemployed for a long time after leaving school. As we have 
seen everywhere else, it is the school leavers who are hardest hit by the economic 
crisis, and the children of migrants who are hit hardest of all. 
Ethnic underclass or modern yuppies 
What have we learnt about the position of the Turkish second generation in the 
various cities? In which cities is an ‘ethnic underclass’ developing and where do we 
find the first group of Turkish yuppies buying expensive apartments? Almost half 
of the married Swedish-Turkish respondents in Stockholm said that they ‘could live 
comfortably’. This statement was also made by a third of the married Turkish second 
generation in France and one in five respondents in Switzerland. These figures were 
significantly lower in all the other countries. In Austria, for example, only 5% said 
that they could live comfortably and 15% said this in Germany. Austria is also the 
country where the largest group – 15% – said that they often could not make ends 
meet on the family budget. 
The picture that arises from these different European countries is very illuminat-
ing. The Turkish second generations in Sweden and France do well in education, and 
reasonably well to well in the job market, mainly thanks to the high participation rate 
of women. There is a significant number of highly educated double earners in France 
and Sweden and these numbers are set to increase in the future. The position of the 
Turkish second generation in Germany and Austria is the exact opposite. 
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Performance at school lags far behind, many women do not enter the employment 
market and many men do minimally-skilled or unskilled work. 
In the social debate on integration, the host country is usually viewed as a given, 
static factor. The magnifying glass is nearly always focused on the groups of migrants: 
why do they drop out of education, why don’t women participate in the employment 
market? But if we compare young people with the same background (parents born in 
Turkey) and the same starting position (all born in Europe to low-educated parents) 
a very different picture emerges. It becomes apparent that the way in which the host 
society is organised plays an enormous role. The gigantic differences in results aris-
ing from differences in the various education systems and care arrangements begin 
to show us what a successful integration policy should look like. 
It is also striking that while the social debate on migrants and their children often 
focuses on boys, this European comparison in effect demonstrates the crucial role 
played by young women. One can sum this up by saying that the societies which offer 
these second generation women good educational opportunities and the possibility 
of combining work with caring for their family through subsidised childcare, illus-
trate the positive side of this story. Countries that fail to do this are creating a poten-
tial underclass, and unfortunately the consequences of this failure will also manifest 
themselves in the third generation.
Emancipation of the second generation
There is significant social mobility in some countries. The upwardly mobile group is 
also undergoing an important emancipation. Girls from the Turkish second genera-
tion who obtain their pre-university (vwo) diploma will be strongly motivated to go 
on to university, having already invested six years in secondary education. Once at 
university, these girls focus on their studies rather than on finding a marriage part-
ner, and parents also accept a university study as a legitimate reason for postponing 
marriage. After investing so much in their study, students actually want to do some-
thing with it. By this time they are at an age where they can demand more control 
over their lives. A girl leaving school at sixteen is much less able to assert herself. 
Our research (Crul et al. 2012) shows that many young women postpone marriage 
and children after university because they want to concentrate on their career. The 
essence of this story is that emancipation does not result from voluntary or forced 
assimilation into the national norm: it is the result of individual development and 
making the most of the opportunities you are given.
The socially and economically successful second generation differentiates itself 
sharply in its opinions on all sorts of social topics. In all the cities, they represent 
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the most progressive part of their community, with both men and women being the 
strongest defenders of a woman’s right to work, and they have the most liberal ideas 
about sex before marriage. In France, highly educated Turkish second generation 
men and women are twice as likely as their less well-educated counterparts to think 
that women should be able to work if they have young children. They are also twice 
as likely to think that it is not a problem at all if a woman has a higher position than 
men at work. This trend is the same in all the countries in the study. 
In the introduction to this book, we said that the integration debate was stuck 
in a blind alley. On the one hand, right wing populists refuse to acknowledge the 
demographic reality, and on the other hand the established parties have put assimi-
lation – an idea that has been superseded by the demographic reality – at the heart 
of their political programmes. The progressive parties defend their political agen-
da of assimilation on the basis of progressive values, such as gender equality and 
the right of women to make decisions concerning their own sexuality. They also 
suggest that newcomers and their children must be brought into the ‘modern age’ 
– by force if necessary. Emancipation cannot be achieved by force or coercion. You 
cannot compel women to become emancipated because this is the norm upheld by 
the dominant group any more than you can force men to alter their views about 
sexuality. By demanding assimilation with progressive values, ‘The Left’ has in fact 
thrown the core idea – the belief that these progressive values have as much to offer 
migrants and their children as they do to everyone – of emancipation overboard. We 
have seen that wherever the children of migrants have been given the opportunity 
to develop themselves, and where they are treated equally, they embrace progressive 
values with conviction. In places where they are marginalised, they will embrace 
values that are often even more conservative than those of their parents. 
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Chapter 5
Generation MiX
In a number of countries, the educational system offers important opportunities for 
emancipation. The rising middle classes of Turkish descent in Stockholm and Paris 
are evidence of this. The pronounced inequality in other countries is creating a large 
group of marginalised people. This is an important starting point for the two scenar-
ios of the future that we want to present to the reader in this chapter. We have used 
the ideas of the French political scientist Dominique Moïsi. 
In his ‘Geopolitics of Emotions’ (2009), Moïsi sketches a number of possible future 
scenarios which we have used in a somewhat adjusted form. The first is one of humil-
iation and fear, in which groups retreat further into themselves and society becomes 
more and more polarised. This unappealing scenario represents one end of the 
spectrum. In contrast to this, Moïsi also sketched a scenario of empowerment and 
hope, in which different ethnic groups are able to break down the barriers dividing 
them from each other and whereby equality and emancipation are the most positive 
results.
This ideal scenario of empowerment and hope is the future destiny of the cities 
which offer equal opportunities to newcomers and their children, where racism is 
actively dealt with and where there is an open atmosphere, focused on the wider 
world outside. Here we see, for instance, how migrants and their children identify 
with the country and the city they live in. The doom scenario of fear and humiliation 
will be found in cities where new groups and their children are given few opportuni-
ties for upward mobility and where racism and discrimination are rife. People living 
in these cities will be much more inward-looking and will retreat into their own 
ethnic groups much more often. 
The period of transition to a majority-minority city will have a major influence on 
the direction of the future scenarios. It is an important turning point. The fact that 
the group of native parentage must inevitably lose its dominant position provides a 
potential opportunity to evolve into a more equal society; one which becomes fairer 
due to shifts in power and in which respect grows between ethnic groups. However, 
in cities where social inequality coincides with ethnic dividing lines, this turning 
point can lead to even more polarisation. The middle class derived from the old 
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The largest Turkish second generation group who identify very weakly or not at all with the national 
identity is found in Vienna.
The Turkish second generation in Berlin identifies most strongly with its neighbourhood, but least 
strongly with its city and country. This is perhaps the strongest proof of their marginal position.
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majority group is often the first to retreat into a voluntarily chosen ghetto. They send 
their children to ‘white’ schools and move out of the ‘migrant’ neighbourhoods. 
Iamsterdam
In a popular Dutch tv game show, a young woman with a Moroccan first and last 
name was asked where she came from. Her answer was “Amsterdam.” “Yes,” said the 
game show hostess, “but where do you come from?” “The Netherlands”, answered 
the young woman. With just a hint of irritation in her voice, the hostess said: “Okay, 
but where were you born?” The Moroccan-Dutch woman remained unperturbed 
and answered dryly: “The Netherlands, that’s where I was born and that’s where I 
grew up”.
The media often talks about newcomers who must integrate into society. When 
they do this they are often referring to both migrants and their children. Obviously 
this term is more appropriate when talking about the first generation, because 
they came from a foreign country and had to find a new place in society, though 
for some of them this was many years ago. Their children, however, are increasing-
ly likely to have been born and bred in Germany, France or the Netherlands. They 
have belonged to these societies from the day they were born. As Dutch sociologist 
Willem Schinkel states, they do not stand outside society, but instead form an inte-
gral part of it (Schinkel 2007).
Despite this, many people (as illustrated above) still often label this second gener-
ation as migrants or newcomers. In contrast to the United States, in Europe it is 
much more difficult to claim German, Dutch or French identity. For example, in the 
US, you might describe yourself as Italian-American or African-American. Because 
everyone except the original Native-Americans has come to the United States from 
somewhere else, everyone accepts this way of identifying yourself. You don’t have 
to choose whether you are more Italian or more American, you can still describe 
yourself as an American, even if you place a strong emphasis on your Italian roots 
(Schneider et al., 2012). In fact, part of what makes you an American is your fami-
ly’s history. Now obviously America has been recognised as a land of migration for 
centuries, whereas European countries have only just now awakened from a state of 
denial to realise that they are also immigration countries. Without wanting to ideal-
ise the American situation, we can learn much from how the United States has dealt 
with ethnic and religious differences for hundreds of years.
In Europe, identity is presented increasingly often as a choice between two loyal-
ties. “Is your Turkish background important to you? If so, you cannot really be Dutch 
or German”. People are also questioned in this way in many studies: “Do you feel 
The largest Turkish second generation group who identify very weakly or not at all with the national 
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The Turkish second generation in Berlin identifies most strongly with its neighbourhood, but least 
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Figure 10 
Turkish second generation with low-educated parents: 
Strong or very strong national and local identification 
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more Turkish or more Dutch?” In the ties survey mentioned earlier, these questions 
were separated from each other. So we asked: “To what extent to you feel Turkish” 
and “To what extent do you feel Dutch”. It then emerges that in all countries the 
group that feels both identities equally strongly is much larger than the group that 
feels very Turkish, but hardly at all Dutch (or French, etc.). In Europe, as in America, 
the second generation feels most comfortable if they are able to identify strongly 
with both identities. 
As was made clear by our example from the game show, national identity (I am 
German, French, etc) is the identity that is most difficult for the second genera-
tion to claim. Local or urban identity is usually more open and accessible (I’m an 
 Amsterdammer). It seems that urban identity can provide the second generation 
with an alternative by means of which they can feel at home. It is easier for a young 
person from the second generation to identify themselves as a citizen of Amsterdam, 
than as Dutch. This is also due to the fact that the second generation often stays in 
the city where they were born and bred: between eighty and ninety per cent of our 
respondents had spent their entire lives in the city where we interviewed them. For 
young people from the former majority group this percentage varies per city, but 
on average it is around twenty to thirty per cent lower. They typically moved to the 
city at a later age, so it is often the young people of native parentage who are actually 
newcomers to the city. 
When we examined urban identity, we saw the same differences between countries 
that we had already seen when examining national identity. The Austrian-Turkish 
young people in Vienna identified least strongly with the city. The young people of 
the Turkish second generation in Berlin had the second lowest score: only a minority 
felt strongly that they were Berliners. In Stockholm and Zürich, the Turkish second 
generation had a strong feeling of belonging to their city. They felt this twice as often 
as the young people in Vienna. 
Young people of the second generation are strongly rooted in that even deeper 
layer of the city: their own neighbourhood. They often still live in the neighbourhood 
where they grew up, and where many of their friends and family still live. Sometimes 
their children even go to their old primary school. The dna of the neighbourhood 
is closely interwoven in their lives. They speak the local dialect and have shaped the 
local youth culture of their cities and neighbourhoods to an important extent. Out 
of all the cities, Berlin was the place where the Turkish second generation identified 
most strongly with their neighbourhood (75%). The discrepancy between their weak 
feelings of belonging to their country and city and strong identification with their 
neighbourhood is perhaps the best proof that the Turkish second generation occu-
pies a marginal position in Germany. They feel at home in Kreuzberg, but are not 
accepted as Berliners or Germans.
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This limited identification with national and local identity in Berlin and Vienna is 
a first warning sign of a possible future scenario of fear and humiliation. Conversely, 
the positive outcomes in Zurich, Paris and Stockholm are early indicators of a future 
scenario of empowerment and hope.
In all the countries studied, there was a strong correlation between the feeling of 
belonging and social mobility. The higher their level of education, the more people 
identified with national and urban identity. Women who did not enter the job market 
and unemployed people had the weakest feelings of identification. Instead, they 
scored very highly on identification with their Turkish identity, which they seemed 
to be retreating into.
Interethnic friendships 
The second indication of a scenario of hope is the degree to which interethnic friend-
ships are formed in the cities. In the scenario of fear and humiliation, people retreat 
into their own communities. This is most commonly seen in Berlin and Vienna but 
is less common in Stockholm and Paris. 
The group which is retreating most into itself is made up of young people with 
conservative religious convictions who advocate a political role for Islam. For exam-
ple, they answered the question of whether or not Islam is the only political authority 
with ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’. Nearly everyone in this group prays regularly. A quar-
ter of them pray five times a day. Nearly all attend a mosque regularly (every Friday 
or more often). This group is largest in Berlin (28%) and, unsurprisingly, smallest in 
Stockholm (6%) and Zurich (5%).
In general, these young people hold extremely conservative opinions about the 
role of men and women. In Germany, for example, two thirds of them thought that 
women in managerial positions should not be allowed to be in charge of men, and 
three quarters thought that women shouldn’t work if they have young children. In 
general, they held rather negative views regarding others of their age group with a 
native German background. Although this group is small, it is quite high-profile and 
often features in the media and political debates. Its members are strongly overrep-
resented in the group of young people who leave education early. The absence of any 
chance for social mobility seems to be what drives them to embrace a conservative 
form of Islam, as this provides an alternative identity from which they can derive 
both a sense of self worth and the respect of others. 
The group of native descent who do not have a mixed circle of friends includes a 
sub-group which is retreating into itself and avoids interaction. Their answer to the 
question of how they perceived other cultures was “threatening” or ‘very threatening’. 
Polarisation of ethnic groups which exclude each other is greatest in Berlin and Vienna.
Xenophobes from the old majority group and strictly religious Muslims both 
hold similar conservative opinions on the position of women.
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Figure 11
Turkish second generation with low-educated parents who adhere to  
conservative branches of Islam and young people of native parentage  
who view other cultures as threatening or very threatening
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The largest group to express this opinion was found in Vienna (20%), followed by 
Berlin (18%). The group is smallest in Stockholm (6%). The dynamics in the group 
of young people of native parentage who view other cultures as a threat resembles 
that of the religiously conservative young people of the second generation in many 
ways. They share a number of characteristics: they are most at ease within their own 
group, and like the young religious conservatives of the second generation, they hold 
traditional opinions on the role of women and the distribution of tasks within the 
family. More than half of these young people of native parentage in Germany (the 
country where this group is largest) is opposed to women with young children work-
ing outside the home. So, in many respects, the opinions of this sub-group with 
native parentage are closer to those of the religiously conservative young people of 
the Turkish second generation than they are to those held by other young people of 
native parentage. These intolerant groups are two sides of the same coin. Despite the 
fact that they share so many of the same views, they prefer to avoid each other as 
much as possible. Three quarters of the young people of native parentage who view 
other cultures as a threat would like to leave their neighbourhood because: “there 
are too many migrant families living there”. The vast majority of them do not want to 
send their children to schools that have a significant number of migrant pupils, and 
they deliberately avoid entertainment venues frequented by young people of migrant 
parentage. The attitude of these two groups in the super-diverse city is characterised 
by an oppositional attitude to diversity: oppositional diversity. It is because of these 
two groups that multiculturalism is under attack. Tolerance for their ideas leads to 
intolerance in society.
The young people from both the groups described above marginalise themselves 
by shutting themselves up in their own ethnic group. It is likely that positions of 
power and influence will remain in the hands of the old majority group for some time 
to come. This may be giving this sub-group of young people of native parentage the 
feeling that, despite demographic changes, the group of native parentage will retain 
control of the system. This is a delusion. When the baby boomers leave the employ-
ment market they will undoubtedly be replaced by a much more ethnically diverse 
layer of managers and policy makers.
In the near future, the support network on which these young people depend will 
shrink and be less able to provide influence and opportunities. They will then lack 
this advantageous connection to work and, consequently, a better future for their 
children. These two groups are the visible protagonists of the scenario of fear and 
humiliation. It appears that this scenario is already becoming a reality in Vienna and 
Berlin, where these groups represent a significant proportion of the urban youth.
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The scenario of hope 
Television programme makers like to set up debates in which sharply opposing views 
are expounded by clearly recognisable stereotypes. An imam who condemns homo-
sexuality in debate with a right-wing populist fits well within such a concept. Such 
debates, however, reinforce the perception that the barriers dividing ethnic groups 
are more or less insurmountable, and that everyone operates solely within their own 
ethnic group. ‘Normal’ young people (both second generation and those of native 
parentage) who interact with each other every day are considered less interesting for 
the purposes of such a television formula. However, this group is much larger than 
those groups which are retreating into their own ethnic enclave.
We found the greatest diversity of friends among the young people of the second 
generation. Once more, these young people are found most often in Paris,  Stockholm 
and Zurich and least often in Berlin and Vienna. 
When asked to identify their three best friends, they include young people of native 
parentage, young Muslims from other ethnic groups, and also African or Asian 
youngsters who are not Muslim. You can see these ‘super-diverse groups’ anywhere 
that young people spend their leisure time, such as bars and clubs, shopping centres 
and playing fields. The majority of these young people have at least one young person 
of native parentage among their three best friends.
We call them Generation MiX. An Amsterdam radio station was the first to 
embody this group of metropolitan youngsters. These young people make it a point 
of pride to speak in an Amsterdam accent embroidered with street slang derived 
from Morocco, Turkey and Suriname. In the FunX programme CritiX, these young 
people discuss topical matters which are sometimes, but more usually not, connect-
ed to their ethnic background. These programmes are made by young people from 
different ethnic backgrounds, but they approach each other primarily as citizens of 
Amsterdam, not as the children of migrants.
In all the cities, it is young people of native parentage who appear to be the most 
strongly segregated. One would expect to see this in the young people who view other 
cultures as a threat, but this is also true of the vast majority of other young people of 
native parentage. Although they live in extremely diverse cities where approximately 
half those in their age group have a different ethnic background, the vast majority 
socialise exclusively within their own ethnic group. It would seem that many young 
people of native parentage have ‘an integration problem’ in the super-diverse cities.
The American philosopher Martha Nussbaum (2012) describes civic friendship as 
an important tool for breaking down ethnic dividing lines. According to Nussbaum, 
interethnic friendships teach people to view the world from a new perspective. 
This concerns what the Indian social geographer Ash Amin calls elective affinities: 
People with mixed groups of friends 
are more tolerant and are less likely 
to experience other ethnic groups as 
threatening.
People of native 
parentage are most likely 
to remain within their 
own ethnic group.
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self-chosen friendships (Amin, 2012). The friendship makes it possible for them to 
see the other, without experiencing his or her ‘otherness’ as a threat. Can any proof 
be found of this abstract philosophy? We first focussed on the pioneers among the 
young people of native parentage, those who have mixed groups of friends. Are these 
young people of native parentage more open and tolerant towards the multi ethnic 
society, as Nussbaum claims? Has crossing ethnic group boundaries made them 
less afraid of other cultures, religions and customs? In short, is a scenario of hope 
unfolding in cities where many young people of native parentage have interethnic 
friendships?
Only a limited number of young people of native parentage said a Turkish friend 
was one of his or her three best friends. In some countries, however, this group was 
large enough to allow us to attempt to identify their characteristics. A characteristic 
we found is that the respondents of native parentage had the same level of education 
as their Turkish friend. Some knew each other from their study and others had met 
through work. In contrast to their friends of Turkish descent, the vast majority of the 
young people of native parentage are not religious. As well as crossing ethnic lines, 
these friendships also break down boundaries in the area of beliefs.
But do these friendships lead young people of native parentage to adopt a differ-
ent view of the Turkish community as a whole? Or do they see the Turkish-Dutch 
or Turkish-German friend as the exception – the good Turk – leaving their attitude 
towards the rest of the Turkish community unaltered? We asked all who participated 
in the study how ‘warm’ or ‘cold’ they felt towards different ethnic groups. Most of 
the young people with a Turkish friend said they had ‘warm or very warm’ feelings 
towards the Turkish community as a whole. In France and the Netherlands, young 
people of native parentage who did not have any Turkish friends expressed ‘cold’ 
feelings towards the Turkish population twice as often, and in Germany, these senti-
ments were expressed eight times as often. 
A friendship with a young person of Turkish descent is often reflected in different 
behaviour and choices. They go to places frequented by young people of migrant 
descent twice as often and send their children to mixed schools one and a half times 
more often than respondents of native descent who did not have any Turkish friends. 
Interestingly, these two groups also perceive mutual relationships between the two 
communities differently. The group with Turkish friends were more likely to say that 
relations with the Turkish community are good, and said less often that they had 
deteriorated in recent years. People who did not have any contact with individuals 
from other cultures were the most likely to think that relations between these two 
groups had deteriorated. 
The group of people of native descent who have someone of Turkish descent 
among their three best friends is still rather small. This raises the question of wheth-
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er the idea that interethnic contact always builds a bridge between different groups 
also applies to young people whose mixed group of friends does not include anyone 
of Turkish descent? Do they have a different take on the multi-ethnic society? How 
do they see the Turkish community? We therefore compared young people with and 
without a mixed group of friends who were all living in a similar housing situation; 
namely in a neighbourhood where half or more residents has a migrant background. 
The respondents who only had friends of native parentage saw the multi-ethnic 
society as a threat much more often than respondents of native parentage who had 
friends from a different ethnic group. The differences between the two groups were 
greatest in Germany and Austria. It appears that living in a mixed neighbourhood 
without having contact with people from a different ethnic group leads to feelings of 
unease. The results also showed that, even if they do not have any Turkish friends, 
people who had a mixed group of friends had a more positive attitude to people of 
Turkish descent. Friendships outside one’s own ethnic group also make people more 
tolerant towards groups with which they do not have any intimate contact. 
The hinge generation
From a metropolitan perspective, the second generation is the best equipped to func-
tion in cities as they become ever more diverse. They are what one of our respond-
ents appropriately called the hinge generation. These young people are accustomed 
to moving between their own community and a variety of other ethnic groups from 
an early age. The vast majority of young people from the second generation have a 
mixed group of friends. We will now concentrate on their friendships with young 
people of native parentage. 
Young people from the Turkish second generation with friends of native parentage 
are found at all educational levels except the very lowest levels. Those with a high 
level of education and a job are the ones who most often have friends of native parent-
age. This is logical, because they move in circles where people of native parentage 
predominate. Less well-educated second generation men and women who are not 
active in the employment market are less likely to have friends of native parentage. 
Young people of the second generation and their friends usually have a similar level 
of education; so equality also appears to be an important condition for interethnic 
friendship.
Depending on the city, between one in five and one in three young people from 
the Turkish second generation said that their best friend was of native parentage. 
What characterises these young people? What sets them apart from others of the 
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second generation, and do they, in common with the young people of native parent-
age who have a mixed circle of friends, also have a different attitude to society? The 
vast majority of these young people whose best friend is of native parentage said that 
they were religious. They attach a great deal of importance to their religious identity 
and are upset if someone says something negative about their religion. It is not the 
case, therefore, that they are able to bridge cultural differences because they do not 
attach any value to religion. However, they do seem to have a different approach to 
their religion. Nearly all those in this group see religion as a private matter. Just a 
quarter of them pray regularly. Only a few go to the mosque every week. Most of 
them ‘usually’ eat Halal, depending on the situation. Hardly any women from this 
group wear a headscarf. 
It seems that whether or not someone is Muslim is not what determines how 
sharply they define ethnic boundaries, but rather the way in which they interpret 
their religion. Complying less strictly with religious rules allows more space for 
friendship with non-religious people of native parentage. 
It is striking that there is often a link between having a best friend of native parent-
age and the answers to questions concerning identity and feelings of belonging. 
Nearly everyone in this group identified strongly with the national identity. If this 
group is compared with the group whose three best friends have a Turkish back-
ground, the contrast is immediately obvious. It would seem that friendship is also a 
way of making it easier to identify yourself as Dutch or German. 
Of the young people of the Turkish second generation in Amsterdam with a best 
friend of Dutch origin, 55% said that they felt ‘strongly’ or ‘very strongly’ Dutch, and 
only 9% felt ‘hardly’ or ‘not at all’ Dutch. Only one third of those whose three best 
friends were of Turkish descent felt ‘strongly’ or ‘very strongly’ Dutch, and 30% of 
them felt ‘hardly’ or ‘not at all’ Dutch’. We saw the same pattern in every city.
Most of the group with a best friend of native parentage also identified ‘strongly’ or 
‘very strongly’ with being Turkish. It is therefore not the case that they have substi-
tuted their identity. The friendship with a person of native parentage has significant 
consequences for how they view the old majority population as a whole: the vast 
majority of them had warm feelings towards the old majority population. Once more, 
there are sharp contrasts between this group and the group that only had friends of 
Turkish origin. In most countries, people whose best friend was of native parentage 
had warm feelings towards the population of native decent as a whole twice as often. 
Just as with young people of native parentage with a Turkish friend, the friendship 
with someone of native parentage determines how they see the group as a whole.
 In contrast to the young people who define their identity by adopting an opposi-
tional attitude to diversity (oppositional diversity) the young people described above 
have chosen to have a mixed group of friends. We call this elective diversity. Elective 
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diversity has an important impact on social cohesion and the social climate in a city. 
In addition to these groups, there is another significant group. While members 
of this group are not opposed to diversity, they also do not choose to have a mixed 
group of friends. They have a pragmatic attitude to diversity (pragmatic diversity). 
They do not have either positive or negative feelings about the super-diverse city. 
They merely accept it as a reality in their living environment or at their work. 
There is a convincing correlation between the high incidence of interethnic 
contact in Stockholm and Paris and the high social mobility of the second generation 
in both these cities. For example, highly-educated members of the Turkish second 
generation in Paris have friends of native parentage twice as often as members of the 
Turkish second generation with a lower level of educational attainment. These young 
people are three times as likely to only have Turkish friends. The biggest differences 
can be seen in Berlin: second generation migrants who reach higher education – and 
unfortunately they are few and far between in the German education system – logi-
cally find themselves in a predominantly native German environment. In terms of 
numbers, young people in Berlin who have followed a work placement programme 
are the largest group likely to have friends of native parentage, as they get to know 
these young people at school and in their work placements.
In most situations, being of equal standing is important. In Paris and Stockholm 
they are generally people who have jobs of equal standing appropriate to their higher 
level of education, while in Berlin, it more often involves people working together 
at the middle level. Another important factor that emerges is the participation of 
women in the employment market. Women who do not participate in the employ-
ment market less often have any friends of native parentage. 
The success factors we identified in education and the employment market also 
affect social relationships. Increased opportunities result in more mixing. Most large 
cities in Europe have already become cities where everyone is a minority, especially 
when it comes to the younger generation. If we consider both the friendships of 
the second generation and young people of native parentage, approximately half of 
these inner circle friendships cross ethnic dividing lines. A close network woven by 
these young people, and incorporating many ethnic groups, pervades each of these 
cities. This has an important effect on how they experience the multi-ethnic socie-
ty and how they identify themselves. The mutual relationships between the various 
ethnic groups are, to a significant extent, a reflection of these individual interethnic 
friendships. 
The second generation lives in the most diverse neighbourhoods in the city. They 
are the leaders when it comes to inter-ethnic contacts. The situation of young people 
of native origin will become more like that of a minority group in the future. In that 
way, European cities are becoming like American cities. From a statistical point of 
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view, the chance that young people of native origin will develop friendships across 
ethnic dividing lines is increasing.
Future scenarios for the cities
Interethnic friendships represent a crucial foundation for a scenario of empower-
ment and hope. Conversely, the absence of these friendships will create a breed-
ing ground for fear and humiliation. We can see this most strongly in the young 
people who interpret their Islamic faith in a conservative manner, and in those young 
people of native parentage who perceive the multicultural society as a threat. Neither 
have any desire whatsoever to mix with other groups. The polarisation which exists 
between these two groups is dangerous and represents a real threat to the living 
environment in the city. 
Those with the most diverse group of friendships which bridge the cultural chasm 
are the least likely to view the diversity of the city as a threat. They identify more 
strongly with their city, feel more at ease, and also participate in the entertainment 
circuit, their children’s school and at work more comfortably. What’s more, they do 
so without repudiating or substituting their ethnic background. 
We are convinced that the importance of elective diversity is under-acknowledged 
as a factor for social cohesion within cities. Although they are generally invisible, 
these friendships are the lines of connection which link people in the city to each 
other. They explain why there are so few ethnic conflicts in these increasingly diverse 
cities. Together, the people who connect with each other are a vital counterbalance 
to the groups that strive for polarisation. 
The majority-minority city as opportunity
On 1 January 2011, Amsterdam crossed the magical line to become a majority-mi-
nority city. At that point, only 49.7% of the population of Amsterdam was of Dutch 
descent (o&s, Amsterdam in Figures 2011). Since then, Amsterdammers of Dutch 
descent have been an ethnic minority group, just like all the other ethnic minority 
groups in the city. This milestone was kept out of the news completely. If it had made 
the news, it would probably have been reported in a negative manner. We argue, 
however, that it is precisely this new situation that will provide the opportunities 
necessary for creating a fairer and more equal society. Unlike traditional migration 
countries, the dominance of the established cultural group presents an increasing 
obstacle to social cohesion and equality for the various ethnic groups in the cities. In 
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practice, the increasingly vociferous demands for even the second and third genera-
tion to assimilate is leading to increased exclusion. This exclusion is founded on the 
basis of the comfortable position of the existing majority group. This dominance is 
now slowly drawing to an end. The process is slow because the old majority group still 
holds many of the positions of power, but many of those occupying these positions 
belong to the baby boom generation. The changing of the guard which is approach-
ing as this generation retires may initiate a totally new dynamic within a very short 
space of time. In organisations where the old majority group reaches a simultaneous 
numerical tipping point, both with regard to staff and customer numbers, opportu-
nities will arise for a new climate. This is not some distant prospect or the product 
of utopian thinking, it is the concrete result of the new demographic structure of our 
cities.
The power of numbers is a strongly underestimated element in the development 
of a more equal society, and for combating discrimination and exclusion. Given a 
situation in which everyone in a particular workplace is of native parentage, express-
ing discriminatory remarks may draw criticism from colleagues of native parentage, 
but such remarks can never be challenged by the actual victims of discrimination, 
simply because they have no presence in that workplace. In working environments 
where only one or two employees are of migrant parentage, they occupy a vulnerable 
position. If, however, a quarter or a third of the staff is of migrant parentage, there 
is a definite change in the balance of power from this point on. Once half or more 
employees in a workplace are of migrant origin, it will be the employees of native 
parentage who make discriminatory or exclusory remarks who will, themselves, 
become marginalised. That is the power of numbers. 
A majority-minority city provides opportunities for establishing a more equal soci-
ety. This will not happen by itself. It is up to all of us, in schools, companies, sports 
clubs and other social settings to create this new future. Interethnic friendships are 
crucial to this transformation. This is a change which will certainly be accompanied 
by conflicts and disillusions, but there is no way back. Demographic developments 
point in only one direction: more diversity. 

Four Essays
My Identity
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New Dutch
Murat Isik
I was born in Turkey, but I grew up in the Bijlmermeer district of 
Amsterdam. Just before the coup in 1980, when I was two years old, my 
parents, sister and I moved from Izmir to Germany, where we tried to build 
a new life in the prosperous port city of Hamburg. My father applied for 
political asylum. 
It was the early 1980s, and although hundreds of thousands of Turks were living 
legally in Germany, we were not welcome. We launched several appeal proceedings, 
but the German state would not be moved, and we had to leave. My main memory 
of that time is that we had no home. In Turkey, our precarious financial situation 
had forced us to live with my grandmother and in Hamburg we stayed with friends 
and family. We were always moving from house to house. Sometimes we would stay 
somewhere for a few weeks, at other times we would move on after just a few days. 
When I look back on that time now, it is as if we were fugitives.
Fortunately, when we had to leave Germany my father decided to go not to 
England or Scandinavia, but to the Netherlands. He had heard positive stories about 
Amsterdam, which were soon proved to be true, because on the very day he arrived 
he found a large flat in the Bijlmermeer neighbourhood. My mother, sister and I 
joined him a few weeks later in the winter of 1983. For the first time in our lives we 
had our own house – and what a house! All at once, in that foreign country, we had a 
spacious apartment with three bedrooms, an enormous living room and a bathroom 
that was bigger that the rooms we had slept in in Hamburg. Our flat also had central 
heating, a luxury we had never experienced before, and the balconies at both the 
front and back of the flat were so broad and long that I could play football and ride 
my bicycle on them. Amsterdam fulfilled its promise immediately. 
I went to nursery school for about three months before starting the first class of 
primary school (now known as class 3), where I was told that I had a language defi-
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ciency. My teacher told my mother that she should encourage me to read more and 
advised us to go to the library. My mother didn’t need telling twice: the next day she 
dragged me and my sister to the library in Ganzenhoef. It was the beginning of her 
life’s project – to make sure that my sister and I were able to study to the highest level 
so that later on we would obtain a good position in this hospitable country so full of 
opportunities. Everything else had to take second place. 
I was full of excitement that day as I took out four children’s books about the 
animal kingdom at the lending counter, and I have been an avid reader ever since. 
I entered into a wondrous world that aroused my curiosity with every new page. I 
looked forward to Fridays because that was the day that our mother took us to the 
library. A year later, my love of reading received another boost when I discovered 
the cartoon books packed with Marvel superheroes at the market. Before long, I was 
buying 50 cent comics about the Hulk, Spiderman and the X-men. Not only had my 
language deficiency disappeared by now, but I also excelled at reading aloud. 
Even back then, the Bijlmer was a multicultural neighbourhood. I had friends from 
Surinam, India, Pakistan, Ghana, and even two Turkish friends, as well as Dutch 
friends. We played football and cycled until dark in our car-free, child-friendly 
neighbourhood amongst all those parks and fields. 
Thanks to the mixed population of the neighbourhood, my sister and I grew up 
outside the main Turkish community. My parents maintain that they raised us like 
this on purpose because they wanted to shield us from the suffocating tentacles of 
social control. I think, however, that it was pure coincidence with a dash of good luck 
that we ended up in such a mixed neighbourhood. 
In the late 1980s, satellite dishes arrived in the Netherlands. All of a sudden, 
Turkish TV stations could reach into Turkish-Dutch living rooms. As a child, I 
thought that this was an exciting idea; dozens of Turkish channels to supplement 
the rather sparse programming that was then available. But my parents resolutely 
refused to buy a  satellite dish. They were afraid that we would only watch the Turkish 
channels and that our Dutch would deteriorate. As a result, both the Dutch evening 
news programme and Studio Sport were spared the competition of their Turkish 
counterparts. 
On a beautiful spring day in 1989, we were granted Dutch citizenship. After sign-
ing several important looking documents in front of an official from the city hall, 
my mother looked at me, her eyes shining. With a smile that concealed more than 
mere relief she said ‘We have become naturalised, my son. Now we will definitely be 
allowed to stay here.’ 
I felt immediately that this was a special moment, that all our worries belonged 
to the past. That evening, the Dutch football team played an international match 
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against Germany. While my hero Marco van Basten fought a bitter duel against his 
arch enemy Jürgen Kohler, I sat on the sofa, muttering: ‘I’m naturalised. I’m Dutch 
now.’ 
As time went by, I became increasingly aware that we really had it good in the 
Netherlands. I was fourteen when, in the summer of 1991, we returned to Turkey for 
the first time. I saw then that my family there lived in poverty and that my cousins 
would never have the same opportunities that I had. I felt very guilty, but at the same 
time, I felt aware that I was privileged. It broke my heart when, at the age of sixteen, I 
learnt that I earned more with my silly little part-time job in a supermarket than my 
uncle did as a builder. He was well over fifty, but despite his worn-out body he was 
still working from dawn to dusk in order to give his children a better future.
In the meantime, my sister and I were still working to achieve my mother’s dream. 
Naturally, my father also wanted us to study, but it was my mother who expressed 
this wish out loud time and time again. We worked hard to get through the academic 
track of secondary school (vwo) and we both went on to study at the University of 
Amsterdam, where my sister read communication studies and I read law. We both 
got our degrees. 
I got a job as a lawyer and began to write and publish short stories. My first novel, 
‘Verloren Grond’, was published by Anthos this year. It’s a family history set in Turkey. 
I received an award – the Bronzen Uil Publieksprijs – for it. My book is now in its 
seventh print in five months. Since my debut, people have started asking me more 
about my Turkish background. This doesn’t really surprise me; I was born in Turkey 
and wrote a novel set there. But if, as happened recently in an interview in nrc 
Handelsblad1, I am described as a Turkish writer I say something about it because I 
am a Dutch writer. Of course I have a Turkish background and I also have a Turkish 
passport, but I feel Dutch first and foremost. I dream, think and write in Dutch. I am 
rooted here, this is my country. 
Nowadays, however, when I look at young Dutch people with a Turkish back-
ground it strikes me that many are now turning their focus towards Turkey. They use 
Facebook and Twitter in Turkish, often listen to Turkish music and seize the oppor-
tunity to spend a few days in Istanbul or Bodrum during every holiday. Although 
they were born here, a great many of them see Turkey as the ‘promised land’, the 
country of opportunity. They feel very strongly that not only their roots, but also 
their future lie in Turkey. 
I’m trying to understand this. Of course, Turkey’s economy is doing very well at the 
moment, while in Europe we are struggling with the consequences of the Euro crisis. 
Many highly educated young people therefore think that their diplomas are worth 
1  A quality Dutch broadsheet newspaper
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more in Turkey than they are here, and that they will be more welcome in the higher 
echelons of the business community there than here in the Netherlands. 
But are they not over-romanticising Turkey? How well do they really know the coun-
try other than as a place to enjoy great holidays? I think they would find that real life 
there is a lot harder than the idealised picture they cherish of their parent’s home 
country. Of course, there is nothing wrong with looking for adventure and working 
abroad for a year for experience and the chance to develop yourself – I would even 
recommend it. What I have far more difficulty with is when people romanticise and 
idealise a country that is still developing, a country that is struggling with long-term 
conflicts. Many Dutch Turks who move to Turkey with the idea of making it there 
find that it is a terribly disappointing experience. They cannot get used to the hard-
er mentality, the hierarchy in the workplace, the long working hours, the different 
etiquette, the fact that despite their heritage they are still viewed as a ‘foreigner’, 
and that Turkey is less democratic than the Netherlands. Maybe what is even more 
important is the fact that it is often only then that they realise that they are much 
more Dutch than they would ever have thought possible. 
Despite all this, they continue to yearn for Turkey. This is because something else is 
going on, something which probably weighs more heavily than the factors mentioned 
above. Young people who are now in their twenties grew up in politically turbulent 
years. After the 11th of September attacks in New York, the murders of Pim Fortuyn 
and Theo van Gogh, and in particular, the rise of Wilders, who has managed to make 
right-wing populism salonfähig, a lot has changed both in the Netherlands and in 
Europe. People have begun to talk more and more often in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’, 
and Muslims in particular have been given an unreasonably hard time. In politics, 
the media, the internet and even on the street a harsher climate has developed in 
which it has suddenly become acceptable to express questionable and previously 
suppressed feelings freely. On the Internet, in particular, commentators unashamed-
ly vent their spleen about ‘migrants who don’t belong here and who should go back 
to their own country on a camel’. Often, this virtual rabble try to outdo each other 
when it comes to the vileness of their insults. 
I grew up in a different time. The word ‘allochtoon’.2 was never used when I was 
growing up. I think I was referred to as a migrant or guest worker. I was also called a 
Mohammedan, even though I was not given a religious upbringing. These terms were 
only replaced much later by that damned word, ‘allochtoon’. This word quickly came 
to symbolise everything that was wrong with the multicultural society.  Allochtoon 
2  Not only migrants but their children and even grandchildren who were born here are referred to 
 as ‘allochtonen’ in the Netherlands. In recent years, this word has gained a negative connotation
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became a synonym for being poorly integrated, unable to speak the language prop-
erly, unemployed, living on welfare benefits, owning a satellite dish and possibly even 
being a religious fanatic. An allochtoon was someone who had no prospects, and if 
too many lived in one neighbourhood, people were quick to call it a ghetto. 
After 2001, something happened that I would never have thought possible: the 
Netherlands became increasingly right-wing and populist. Something that had only 
seemed possible in Austria and Denmark was happening in my own country: whole 
sections of the population were being openly excluded; not just occasionally, but time 
and time again. The most surprising thing was that the established parties did not 
have a clue about how to combat the populists. They had no answers. Therefore, they 
decided to become more right-wing themselves. Parties like the vvd and cda made 
an enormous step to ‘the wrong side’, attempting to benefit from the harsh populist 
wind that was raging through our country. In his first speech as prime minister, Rutte 
said ‘Let us give this beautiful country back to the Dutch’. Minister  Verhagen went a 
step further a few weeks later when he said that he ‘understood the fear that people 
had of foreigners’. 
I wondered what was going on in my country. When I couldn’t find an answer, some-
thing happened which I could never have foreseen: I began silently to wonder if this 
was still my country, if I still saw a future for myself in a country where I was constantly 
referred to as an ‘allochtoon’, and even worse, a country where whole groups of people 
were structurally excluded in an increasingly harsh way. I found myself dreaming 
more and more about San Francisco, a city where I had studied for six months in 
2001 with a great deal of pleasure. I told myself that although there were many points 
on which you could criticise America, immigrants are welcomed there (at least if 
they are legal); they are acknowledged as being American and they belong there. 
My uneasiness about the Netherlands continued to grow, and that really upset me. I 
was annoyed that a few incompetent politicians could burden me with such a nega-
tive feeling about my own country and succeed in eroding my feelings of being at 
home here. What gave them the right to do this? Were they really incapable of real-
ising that the future of our country was at stake? And how must the new Dutch 
citizens in working class neighbourhoods feel if even I – a successful and loyal new 
Netherlander – had begun to ask critical questions about my Dutchness?
At the same time, I realised that a time must come when this harsh wind would 
die down again. I counted on people realising that parties like the pvv cannot offer 
any solutions in a country where approximately half of the population of its four 
major cities has a migrant background. Fortunately, the results of the last elections 
confirmed that feeling: populism received a setback and I recovered much of my 
faith and positive feeling.
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I can imagine that it will take longer for many young Dutch people with a Turkish 
background to recover their faith in society and the feeling that they belong here. Most 
of their youth has been overshadowed by negative newspaper headlines such as ‘Islamic 
voting cattle’ and the ‘head rag tax’ 3 which caused some of them to feel that they did not 
really belong anywhere. 
However, there are also positive developments: an increasing number of young Dutch 
Turks are studying at colleges of higher education and universities and are finding well-
paid jobs afterwards. This is very important, because the feeling that they can make a 
career here is essential for a positive perspective and a feeling of belonging. What would 
help enormously would be a statement from the government that reinforces this feeling. 
I think, for example, that they could scrap the word ‘allochtoon’, at least to refer to the 
new generation who were born in the Netherlands and who have a Dutch passport. It 
may be difficult for someone who has never been referred to as an allochtoon to imagine 
how it feels to have that word thrown at them and so they might easily underestimate 
the effect that such a measure would have. But I can assure them that it matters a great 
deal whether you are referred to as an allochtoon or a new Dutchman (a much better 
alternative). This is something that the government could do, at least to start off with, 
and it is something that they should do in order to make this group feel more at home. 
In their turn, young Dutch people with a Turkish background could take a step 
towards boosting this process by making a greater effort to embrace the Netherlands – 
which, after all, is their native country – and, by referring to themselves as Dutch. They 
do not have to conceal the fact that they have warm feelings towards Turkey; the one 
does not have to exclude the other. However, I would also like to say to them, don’t let 
yourself be excluded by the word ‘allochtoon’: focus, grab the chances that you undeni-
ably have here, and don’t let the populists influence your thinking. Show that this is also 
your country! The Netherlands needs you and you need the Netherlands – much more 
than you may realise at this point.
3 This term, which Geert Wilders used to refer to headscarves has a particularly offensive tone in  
 Dutch as he used the word ‘kop’, which is used to describe an animal’s head, instead of the word  
 ‘hoofd’ which denotes a human’s head.
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My identity as a Barnevelder and an Amsterdammer
Semra Çelebi
My father always told us “If a Dutch person asks you what you are, say 
that you are Turkish. If a Turk asks you what you are say you are Kurdish” 
I related this in a panel discussion held in Berlin in 2007, on which there 
were three other students: a Bulgarian student from Romania, an Algerian 
student from Paris, and a Turkish student from Berlin. I noticed that the 
Berlin-Turkish student felt very Turkish, the Algerian Parisian felt totally 
French and I was somewhere in the middle.
Barneveld: The only Turkish girl
When I was following my academic track secondary education at the Protestant 
Johannes Fontanus College, I did my best to resemble my Dutch friends of native 
parentage as closely as possible. I was the only migrant and the only Muslim in the 
class. I also wore a headscarf. Almost every year, I gave a speech about Islam to the 
class during Bible studies in which I let everyone ask me questions about Islam. I 
joined in with the playback show at school, took my headscarf off for gym classes 
and even sang a duet in the school play. In addition to all this, I had lessons in the 
Koran every weekend in the mosque with all the other Turkish Muslim children. 
But even during these Sunday classes I was the odd one out. I didn’t live in a Turkish 
neighbourhood, I ate sauerkraut at home and when I spoke Dutch, I used too many 
‘difficult’ words. In short, I was different in both worlds because of religion, use of 
language and customs. I felt different, but enormously accepted; in fact people could 
not get around me. 
In those days I was active in the Islamic conservative organisation Milli Görüs 
(2001-2004), and often participated in debates about the integration of minorities 
in the Netherlands. I was very involved and was always defending my viewpoint: 
 “Integration is not assimilation – join in, but keep your own identity!” I was convinced 
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that I had totally worked out my own identity. I was a Turkish Muslim. I got angry 
with people who compared headscarves to the old fashioned punk hairdos. I stud-
ied law at the University of Utrecht and did well. I went to England as an Erasmus 
student, looking for freedom in that way. My parents thought that studying was more 
important than anything else, as long as we kept to the values and standards of Islam. 
If we ‘went too far’ the adventure would soon be over. My father was very firm on 
that point. I was given many opportunities and I made good use of them. During my 
internship at the European Parliament in 2007, however, I began to ask myself what 
exactly my values and standards were.
Amsterdam: it doesn’t matter what I am
I moved to Amsterdam later in 2007. It’s my place of refuge – my Amsterdam – far 
away from the social control imposed by both Christians and Muslims in Barneveld. 
Away from the bourgeois, away from religion. Here is where I began my life as a 
Muslim without a headscarf; it’s where I began to follow my own path and to explore 
my boundaries. Who am I? What do I want? Who do I want to be? Am I still a 
Muslim or not? And who do I see as being a Muslim? Am I a Dutch Turk or a Turkish 
Dutchwoman? Actually, it doesn’t really matter what I am in Amsterdam, because 
everyone is different here. There is no homogeneity. People are surprised to hear 
that I lived in the expensive Vossiusstraat, but I am firmly convinced that this neigh-
bourhood will also have a Turkish bakery on the corner one day. I do not represent 
anything. I don’t fit in a pigeon hole. I don’t want to assimilate into the Netherlands 
by adopting a broader range of values and norms, because I don’t believe in that. 
I believe in universal standards and values: the values of equality and freedom 
without hurting other people; without taking it to excess. I am who I am. I’m Semra 
and I am a proud citizen of Amsterdam.
Semra Çelebi is a citizen of Amsterdam, feminist & fashion lover, and a graduate 
lawyer. As Diversity Advisor Amsterdam, she is responsible for developing young 
talent within the municipality of Amsterdam. She organised the inspiring conference 
Pioniers van Toen & Nu (Pioneers Past and Present) as part of the celebrations to 
mark 400 years of relations between Turkey and the Netherlands.  
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Turk and Gay
Serdar Manavoglu
Many Dutch homosexuals think that Turkish homosexuals should just give 
up their Turkish identity, if it’s causing so much bother, and become happy 
Dutch homosexuals. But in a collective culture like the Turkish one, you 
can’t just choose your homosexual identity for yourself; it also involves your 
family and the people you know.
 
It is official: for the first time, a Turkish boat participated in the Amsterdam Gay 
Pride regatta. It was an extraordinary event. Anyone could have predicted that 
the participation of a Turkish Boat in the Pride would cause a commotion in the 
Turkish community, but even I didn’t expect so much fuss. I am Turkish, Dutch, 
an Amsterdammer and a gay man. I’m also a partner, brother, swimmer, political 
science graduate, an events programmer for the Paradiso and much more…
This is just natural for me. At least, it is now. It really wasn’t easy, after studying 
and working as a policy official for Amsterdam City Council, to switch to working in 
the Dutch cultural world so that my Turkish roots, my close connections with both 
Amsterdam and Istanbul and my homosexuality could all be reflected in my work. It 
was even more difficult to make my sexual orientation and ethnic identity known in 
my own environment. I had the necessary discussions with family and friends before 
I went ahead. I’ve been lucky in love, as I have a fantastic partner who supports me. 
Eventually, everyone realised that I was still the same Serdar they had always known, 
and maybe this is why I can bring so much enthusiasm to my work when it involves 
connecting Istanbul and Amsterdam, Turks and non-Turks. Also, the fact that I 
make this connection with music, dance and the performing arts – and by raising 
social issues and taboos – may be a factor. Although, when I’m programming events 
for Paradiso, I primarily want to share new forms of art and content with new target 
groups, it is also about me expressing what I consider to be ‘myself ’. My Turkish and 
my homosexual identity are inextricably bound. That is not, or at least not yet, natu-
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ral in everyone’s eyes. This is exactly what having a Turkish boat on the Amsterdam 
canals during Gay Pride was expressing. And that, of course, made waves.
Those who were recognised from photos of the boat were jeered and cursed at. The 
politicians who sailed on the boat were pilloried in the social media, and people were 
urged not to vote for them. Some Turkish people simply don’t believe that it is possi-
ble to be both Turkish and gay. These people think that you can choose. They see 
homosexuality as a feature of the modern age, and believe that, as a Turkish homo-
sexual, you have rejected your Turkish identity. You have become a ‘real Dutchman’, 
out of control and degraded.
On the other hand, many Dutch homosexuals also seem to think that there is a 
choice to be made. In their view, perhaps Turkish homosexuals should give up their 
Turkish identity and traditions if they want to come out of the closet and become 
happy individuals. This is obviously not really a choice for many Turkish Dutch 
homosexuals, because how can you give up an ethnic identity and replace it with a 
sexual identity? 
Thanks to this one-dimensional view of homosexuality and identity, many Turkish 
homosexuals (who are often married to heterosexual partners) are not only in the 
closet but are also having to cope with feeling torn in two opposite directions. Our 
most important slogan on the Turkish boat was ‘My honour, whose shame?’ In a 
collective culture like the Turkish culture, your choice of identity is not only yours 
to make; it also involves your family and the people you know. This is what causes 
this feeling of being torn between your sexuality and your culture. For many Turkish 
homosexuals, the negative reactions that they experience are not the worst thing 
they have to cope with. They hold their heads up high, strengthened by the thought 
that they have chosen for a life in the sun, instead of in the shadows. But the idea 
that your father is longer welcome in the coffee house – that you have shamed your 
family – can be soul destroying.
It seems to be very upsetting for some Turks to see a Turkish homosexual with the 
Turkish flag, or to read that a Turkish homosexual describes himself as Muslim. It is 
as if these people think that they are the only ones with a right to pride or religious 
faith. Comments such as ‘Homosexuals wear the blood of martyrs on a decadent 
boat’ were made on Turkish Dutch websites and Facebook pages. And it did not 
stop there: some people were even threatened because they had been on the boat. 
It is shocking to see young Dutch Turks apparently trying to outdo each other in 
patriotism, and using respect for the flag as their measure of this dubious virtue. 
 According to them, anything which deviates from this should be verbally assassinat-
ed (and literally assassinated too, according to some of them). Gays and the Turkish 
flag are incompatible. 
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Why should I have to choose between my ethnic and cultural identity and my 
sexual identity? At the end of the day, everyone has to decide upon his or her identity 
and life, even if other people have a problem with that decision or think that there is 
only one way in which it is acceptable to live. You must then decide not to allow other 
people to restrict your choices, and to shape your own emancipation. It helps if you 
have role models who have already been faced with this decision and have dared to 
make this choice for themselves. 
Turkish gays who had been scared to be tagged on Facebook photos with their 
friends – scared to be recognised as a homosexual – stood on the Turkish boat 
posing for the cameras, singing along at the top of their lungs to Zeki Muren, the 
star of Turkish classical music, whose number Yarali Gonu (tortured heart) was 
played over and over again. Zeki Muren lived his entire life in the closet, but these 
young people want to live out in the open. The Turkish boat made them visible. 
Turkish Dutch gays had never felt so welcome or so proud of the Netherlands. Some 
friends of mine stood on the canal-side, cheering, together with an older couple from 
 Amsterdam. This older couple said that it was the first time they had had real contact 
with Turks. That is really quite strange when you think about it, what a weird and 
wonderful world.
In the days after Gay Pride, we were deluged with declarations of support and 
messages from hundreds of young Turkish homosexuals, both at home and abroad. 
Turks from Turkey who were here on holiday stood along the canals to watch, 
together with their Dutch-Turkish friends. In October, I visited Turkey to organ-
ise the Pink Amsterdam festival in Istanbul. Everyone knew what we had done in 
 Amsterdam. The success of the Turkish boat was way beyond our wildest dreams. In 
Turkey, homosexuality is generally allowed if it is possible to turn a blind eye to it. 
There is a growing gay nightlife scene in Istanbul, but nothing, or hardly anything, 
in the rest of the country. There are also a number of active gay rights organisations. 
However, Turkish television broadcasts shows presented by drag queens. This was 
our inspiration for the satellite dishes that decorated the side of the Turkish boat. But 
even if homosexuality is a visible phenomenon on the streets of Istanbul, and on tele-
vision, homosexuals get a rough deal from the law. Their basic human rights are still 
being violated. You can be sacked because of your sexual orientation, assuming you 
ever manage to get a job in the first place. A landlord can refuse you a house, or as 
happened recently, intolerant neighbours can drive you out of your house by violent 
means and the police will not help, or will only offer minimum assistance, because 
they do not want to be seen to take the side of a homosexual against a supposedly 
honourable family with children. 
The reactions in Istanbul to our initiative with the Turkish boat during Gay Pride 
made me realise what it was all about for the first time. We had really let people see 
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something: ourselves and our choices. Maybe, just maybe, as Dutch Turks we can 
also be proud of our tolerant fellow Dutch Turkish citizens; and they can be proud 
of us.
Serdar Manavoglu works as a programme organiser for Paradiso. Under the flag of Pera, a 
foundation that he set up himself, he organises events with contemporary artists, musicians and 
DJs from Istanbul and Amsterdam. He is the initiator of Pink Istanbul and co-organiser of the 
Turkish Boat. The Turkish Boat was an initiative of D. Fil, Stichting Elance and Pink Istanbul.
This article was published earlier in a slightly different form in the Volkskrant.
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Super-diversity
Maurice Crul
In this book, I have stated that European cities are following American 
cities in the sense that they are becoming majority-minority cities with 
super-diverse populations. This transformation of the city, which has taken 
place over the past fifty years, has run in parallel with my own life. It is 
part of my personal history, first in The Hague, and later in Amsterdam.
I grew up in what is now a suburb of The Hague. I was born in 1961, on the fifth and 
highest floor of a typical post-war block of flats, as the second child in my family. My 
sister had already taken possession of the only children’s room in the flat, and so my 
bed was a fold-out bed in the dining room. I mostly played outdoors during the day 
and when it got dark I went indoors to play under the dining table or in the living 
room, close to the coal-fired heater. When bedtime came, I was first put to bed in my 
parent’s bed, and then transferred to my own fold-out bed in the dining room later 
in the evening. 
By the 1980s, this kind of flat in Amsterdam New West, or the Zuilen neighbourhood 
in Utrecht, usually housed a much larger Turkish or Moroccan family. I often visited 
such flats in the 1990s to conduct interviews with Turkish and Moroccan youngsters 
of the second generation. I saw how their parents had found ingenious ways to create 
three or four sleeping spaces for their daughters in rooms that I recognised as being 
exactly like my sister’s bedroom. As had been the case with me, the dining room 
provided a sleeping space for the boys. Complete with their satellite dishes, these 
flats symbolised segregation in the Dutch housing market. 
Back then, my neighbourhood was mainly home to young, lower-middle class 
families. We played in the courtyards and rode our scooters around two, four or 
eight blocks of flats. This was the kind of diversity I knew in my early childhood. 
We knew that the people who lived in the houses on the other side of the stream 
belonged to a higher social class, but I also knew children from my football team 
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whose pronounced Hague accent proclaimed their working class background. At 
primary school, ethnic diversity only became visible in the last year groups, when 
children who had come directly from Suriname joined our class. One Surinamese 
boy, Ulrick, became one of my best friends. I never went to his house, but he some-
times visited mine. My mother never remarked upon his dark skin or his Surinamese 
background (or at least I don’t remember her ever doing so) but she was worried 
about his school career. Ulrick was clever, but his Dutch vocabulary and language 
skills were limited. Just like me, Ulrick was a fanatical street footballer. We usually 
hung around the school’s football yard with other boys after school. I lost touch with 
Ulrick because he went to a non-academic, vocational school and I went to a class 
that gave me access to an academic track. 
At my secondary school, ethnic diversity was represented by the Indonesian boys 
and girls. The most popular among the boys played in a band, something which 
gave them enormous status. My Chinese Dutch Indonesian secondary school friend 
Richard was at the other end of the spectrum. He didn’t belong anywhere and he 
looked like a nerd. Richard’s mother was illiterate. I often visited Richard’s house 
because he lived close to school. He always told his mother to leave the room rather 
gruffly whenever we arrived. His attitude never failed to shock me, but I put it down 
to a kind of shame. Just like me, Richard was passionately interested in ‘politics’, a 
topic we had discovered during social studies lessons. A group of pupils who were 
interested in left-wing political topics slowly grew up around us. This group was very 
diverse in terms of age, clothing style, and level of education. Political commitment 
was our binding factor. 
I have lived in Amsterdam now for more than twenty years. My own circle of 
friends and colleagues is diverse with a slight Moroccan and Turkish accent, which 
can be explained by my involvement in Moroccan and Turkish student associations 
in the early 1990s: I grew up and became an adult along with this group. The young 
pioneers from those days are now prominent in business circles or have become 
successful in other ways; as head teachers, psychiatrists or lawyers. I have known 
them now for almost twenty years. Some have changed from being left-wing activists 
and become active believers, while others have lost their religious faith even more. 
Almost all of them have become proud parents. 
As a convinced atheist, I have often discussed religion with them. The way in which 
most of them practise their religion comes very close to what I would call humanism. 
You live for others, not just for yourself, you are hospitable and you help people if 
you can. This is not just what they say; this is what they do. This is characteristic of 
the older second generation. When I first got to know them in the 1990s they were 
in sharp contrast to the individualistic Dutch youngsters of the time, many of whom 
seemed to think they were the centre of the universe. The younger second genera-
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tion, who often have parents who grew up partially in the Netherlands, are more like 
the Dutch. They are individualistic and seem to have much in common with their 
opportunistic Dutch contemporaries. I admit that I have mixed feelings about this 
form of assimilation. 
Living in New York in 2009-2010 because of a fellowship, I had my first experi-
ence of being a migrant, after studying the phenomenon for twenty years. I only had 
problems adapting for the first week, mainly regarding practical matters. Where can 
I find an affordable supermarket? How do I turn the shower on? I was confused. Was 
this the large rift that migration opened up? Because of my salary I got, unlike many 
migrants, all opportunities to participate fully. I enjoyed the stimulating intellectual 
climate to the full and felt relieved to be away from the claustrophobic Netherlands 
of Wilders. New Yorkers were open towards me. They may have asked where I came 
from, but it wasn’t because they wanted to know when I would be leaving again. They 
assumed that I wanted to stay in New York because they were proud of the magnetic 
attraction that their city has for people. 
My best insight into today’s super-diverse city is provided for me by my 22-year-
old son and 11-year old daughter (choosing two cohorts is an occupational disa-
bility). They have grown up in a super-diverse city since early childhood. At the 
neighbourhood crèche in the Staatsliedenbuurt district, our son was one of the few 
children with blond hair. When it was Eid, he came home with sweets. At secondary 
school, he appropriated the language of the street, a vocabulary largely derived from 
Surinamese and Moroccan words. His girlfriends have reflected the many different 
colours of the city. 
But what does my ethnic identity mean to me? Our family goes to Turkey nearly 
every year for a week of sunshine. In the plane, I always instinctively look around 
at my countrymen and wonder what I have in common with these people. Do I feel 
a connection with them on the basis of our shared ethnic background? Do I share 
something with them? Am I a typical Dutchman? At the same time, I am a fanatical 
supporter of the Dutch national football team and foreign academic colleagues say 
that I am typically Dutch in my directness. Zygmund Bauman would characterise 
this as a liquid identity. My Dutch identity solidifies temporarily during the World 
Cup, but liquefies again on the plane to Turkey. In most situations and for the most 
important parts of my life, identities other than my ethnic identity are more impor-
tant. My identity as an academic, my identity as a father involved in my daughter’s 
super-diverse football team, my metropolitan Amsterdam or even New York identi-
ty, because actually, I feel homesick for New York.
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Maurice Crul is a professor at the Free University in Amsterdam and Erasmus University  
in Rotterdam. His work is mainly focused on the obstacles and opportunities that  
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super
diversity
Maurice Crul
Jens Schneider
Frans Lelie
In 2011, Amsterdam became a majority-minority city. The inhabitants of 
Dutch descent officially became a minority. Only one in three young people 
under the age of fifteen is of native parentage. In short: big cities in the 
Netherlands and in other West-European countries are becoming super-
diverse. So far, however, no intellectual perspective has been formulated  
in response to this development.
Super-diversity offers a new perspective within the integration debate by 
defining the conditions required for a scenario of hope for today’s large 
multi-ethnic cities. We are standing at the crossroads: this international 
comparison shows how a hopeful future is dawning in those cities which 
provide education and employment opportunities for the children of 
immigrants. The successful second generation is taking the lead when it 
comes to emancipation. Highly-educated young people are advocating 
gender equality in their community, as well as the individual’s right to 
decide about their sexuality. 
The super-diversity perspective sheds new light on today’s urban society. 
It is the perspective of a growing group of city dwellers who are decidedly 
intolerant of intolerance and the limitation of personal freedom.  
We are proposing a progressive alternative to the problematic aspects of 
multiculturalism that demanded tolerance for all cultural opinions and 
customs, even those which propagated intolerance towards others.
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